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Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus
Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs"

was a "War on Blacks"
Kenneth B. Nunn*

INTRODUCTION

The War on Drugs I has had a devastating effect on African American
communities nationwide. Throughout the drug war, African Americans have
been disproportionately investigated, detained, searched, arrested and charged
with the use, possession and sale of illegal drugs. 2 Vast numbers of African
Americans have been jailed and imprisoned pursuant to the nation's tough drug
trafficking laws, implemented as part of the War on Drugs. 3 Indeed, in some
*

Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law.

1. By "War on Drugs" I mean the anti-drug policies and law enforcement practices
commenced by the Reagan administration in the fall of 1982 and continued by the Bush and Clinton
administrations until at least the end of the year 2000. This period is only the most recent
manifestation of America's ongoing war against drugs. Clarence Lusane states that "[n]early every
President since World War II has declared a 'war on drugs."' CLARENCE LUSANE, PIPE DREAM
BLUES: RACISM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 77 (1991). Steven Witsotsky has identified three wars
against drugs in American history. See STEVEN WITSOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS:
OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY xvii-xviii (1990). The first began with the passage of the
Harrison Act in 1914 and includes the period of its enforcement by the Department of the Treasury.
Id. at xvii. President Nixon commenced the second in the late 1960's. Id. at xviii. Nixon's "total
offensive" against drugs set the pattern for the drug war waged by Reagan, Bush and Clinton. See
id. For more on America's earlier drug wars, see EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR (1977)
(examining anti-drug campaigns from the turn of the century through the Nixon presidency). It
remains to be seen whether the younger Bush will continue the federal government's drug war
policies, since law enforcement resources and priorities have shifted to "the war against terrorism."
2. 1 discuss the ways the War on Drugs has impacted African American communities in
Section I (A)(2). See infra notes 74-215. For sources that address racial disparities in drug
enforcement practices generally, see Floyd Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice
System on the Status of African American Males, 23 CAP. L. REV. 23, 27-43 (1994) (detailing the
disproportionate investigation, arrest, charging and sentencing of Black men within the criminal
justice system); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703 (2000)
(detailing racial disparities in the prosecution of drug laws); D.J. Silton, US. Prisons and Racial
Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53, 61 (2002) (reporting
that between 1976 and 1989 "the total number of drug arrests of Caucasians grew by 70%, compared
to a 450% increase among African Americans" and that the number of Caucasians incarcerated for
drug offenses increased by 50% from 1986 to 1991, while the number of African Americans
incarcerated increased by 350%).
3. See Silton, supra note 2, at 61(While African Americans are 13% of the U.S. population
and 13% of drug users they are 35% of drug arrests, 55% of drug convictions, and 74% of drug
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jurisdictions, the majority of African American men age thirty-five and under
are within the grip of the criminal justice system. 4 Nationally, more African
American men go to prison than go to college, 5 and African American males are
6
incarcerated at a rate that is almost eight times higher than that for white males.

Indeed, it appears that African Americans-and African American males in
particular-are the real targets of the country's drug enforcement efforts. 7 In the
minds of the criminal justice system's managers, planners and workers, drugs are

frequently associated with African American citizens and their communities.

8

imprisonments.).
4.

See JEROME G.

MILLER, NATIONAL CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES,

HOBBLING A GENERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN WASHINGTON D.C.'s CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM (April 1992) (In Washington D.C., 42% of African American males ages 18-35 are
in penal institutions, on probation, or on parole.) [hereinafter MILLER, WASHINGTON, D.C.]; JEROME
G. MILLER, NATIONAL CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, HOBBLING A GENERATION:
YOUNG AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF AMERICA'S CITIES:

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND (Sept. 1992) (In Baltimore, 56% of African American males ages 18-35
are in penal institutions, on probation, or on parole.) [hereinafter MILLER, BALTIMORE].
5. Almost a decade ago, the Sentencing Project reported that Black males in prison
outnumbered Black males in higher educational institutions in the United States. See MARC MAUER,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF
INCARCERATION, 1992-93, at 18 (1994) (reporting 583,000 African American males in prisons or
jails in 1992 while number enrolled in institutions of higher education was 537,000). Since the time
of the Sentencing Project's 1994 report, the gap between African American education and
incarceration has widened considerably. In 1997, there were 579,800 African American males in
higher education institutions (undergraduate, graduate and professional). STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 2000, at 184 tbl.268 (2001). However, over a third more African American
males (791,270) were incarcerated in prisons or jails in 1997. Of this total, 237, 900 Black males
were held in jail facilities. Id. at 220 tbl.367. An additional 553,370 African American males were
housed in prisons under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997, at 78 tbl.5.7
(2000). See also, DAN MACALLAIR, KHALED TAQI-EDDIN, & VINCENT SHIRALDI, JUSTICE POLICY

INSTITUTE, CLASS DISMISSED: HIGHER EDUCATION VS. CORRECTIONS DURING THE WILSON YEARS
(1998), available at http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/classdis.html (reporting that for every Black male
enrolled in California public universities, there are five African American males in state correctional
institutions).

6.

See infra note 76 and accompanying text.

7. According to researcher Christina Johns, "There is no question that the enforcement
tactics of the War on Drugs are focused on minority populations." CHRISTINA JACQUELINE JOHNS,
POWER, IDEOLOGY, AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 73 (1992). See also Weatherspoon, supra note 2, at
30-31 (describing the War on Drugs as virtually "synonymous" to policing African American
communities and Black males); Silton, supra note 2, at 61 (Gross racial disparities in drug cases
"indicate that through the enforcement and prosecution of the drug laws, the United States is, in
effect, waging a war on Blacks."); john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War:
The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 559
(199 1) ("[T]he war on drugs could more aptly be called a war on the minority populations").
8. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword.: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 813 (1999) (asserting "myths of Black
criminality are so embedded in the white psyche that it seems perfectly natural to many Americans
that Blacks are disproportionately [stopped, arrested and imprisoned]"); powell & Hershenov, supra
note 7, at 559 (claiming widespread public association of drugs with minority group members);
Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, § 6 at 50, 53 (reporting the
belief among police officers that Blacks and Hispanics are "the blue collar backbone of the country's
heroin - and cocaine - distributions networks").
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The criminal justice system shapes its policies and practices according to this
perception. 9 Consequently, police expend greater resources and time looking
for drug infractions in Black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods and
focus the bulk of their energies on Black suspects rather than white ones.
The targeting of the Black 1 community by law enforcement agencies has
produced enormously harmful, but entirely predictable, results. 12 As a
consequence of the War on Drugs, large numbers of African American males
have been virtually erased from African American communities and
incarcerated in prisons and jails. This mass incarceration of African American
males has created many endemic problems for African American communities,
including:
[T]he loss of male role models and fathers for African American
youths; the loss of husbands and male companions for African
American women; the loss of earnings and wealth for the African
American community; the loss of membership of important African
American organizations and institutions; the preclusion of the

9. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity. Racial Profiling
and Stops and Searches without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 308 (2001) (reporting the "widely
held view[ ]-within and without law enforcement circles-that African Americans and other
minorities commit a disproportionate number of crimes and, therefore, they are justifiably targeted"
for disproportionate law enforcement practices); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 575 (2001) ("[C]lass based, and hence to some degree racebased, [drug] enforcement remains common.").
10.

According to one scholar:

Because of differential enforcement patterns, blacks are imprisoned at a rate greater
than they deserve given the offenses they commit. Police commonly look at African
American neighborhoods-and at African Americans-with greater scrutiny than they
do in white neighborhoods or at whites. The cumulative effect of differential
enforcement patterns is that blacks receive greater sentences because they have more
contacts with the police, and consequently have a greater likelihood of conviction and
a longer criminal history.
Alfred L. Brophy, Losing the (Understanding of the Importance a)9 Race: Evaluating the
Significance of Race and the Utility of Reparations,80 TEX. L. REV. 911, 916-17 (2002).
11. 1 use "Black" and "African" interchangeably throughout this article to refer to persons
who are of African descent. "Black" denotes racial and cultural identity rather than mere physical
appearance and is, therefore, capitalized. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race,
Ideology, and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 64 n. 7 (1993). In order
to emphasize the connectedness of all members of the African diaspora, I will use the term "African
American" only when it is necessary to distinguish African people resident in the United States from
African people elsewhere.
12. 1 discuss Michael Tonry's claim that the drug war's effects on the African American
community were predictable and avoidable. See infra notes 228-43 and accompanying text. For
other scholars who make similar claims, see powell & Hershenov, supra note 7, at 599 (arguing that
law enforcement efforts to curb drug use are misguided and threaten the lives and health of African
American citizens); RONALD K. SIEGEL, INTOXICATION: LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE
279-95 (1989) (detailing ineffectiveness of several methods of drug prohibition and concluding that
all wars on drugs are doomed to fail); JOHNS, supra note 7, at 1-31 (discussing social costs of the
War on Drugs and concluding that "if the government were sincerely concerned with reducing, if not
stopping, the use of dangerous drugs, it would have learned from past mistakes and pursued a
different strategy.").
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educational and social development of the incarcerated; and the
encouragement of the spread of AIDS.13
In addition, the police strategy of concentrating aggressive street-based law
enforcement measures on the low income communities where the vast majority
of African Americans live has only made drug dealing a more lucrative, if not
gain. 14
dangerous, choice for young Black men seeking economic
Consequently, there is increased conflict, violence, and death as new street
dealers seek to replace those arrested by the police. 15 In waging the War on
Drugs, police have detained African American pedestrians and drivers without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, gained consent for searches through
coercion, and conducted indiscriminate seizures of property and cash as
proceeds of drug trafficking. 16 These types of tactics have led to harassment
and the curtailment of African American privacy rights. 17 Moreover, aggressive
law enforcement practices such as these can only contribute to the feelings of
African Americans have toward police, courts, and the government
distrust that
18
generally.
What made the War on Drugs become, for all practical purposes, a war on
Blacks? In this article, I argue that the drug war's focus on the African
American community was neither an accident nor a conspiracy. Rather, the
drug war is simply a prominent example of the central role both race and the
definition of crime play in the maintenance and legitimization of white
supremacy. Race and crime, as two significant social phenomena, are linked in
an endless cycle of oppression. 19 What is defined as crime determines who is
oppressed in American society and simultaneously legitimates that oppression.

13. Kenneth B. Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African Americans Prosecute
Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1481-82 (2000) [hereinafter Nunn, Darden Dilemma].
14. See JOHNS, supranote 7, at 63-64 (arguing that the criminalization of drugs drives up the
profits that are to be gained from selling them and makes drug dealing an attractive alternative for
the underemployed).
15. See Doug Bandow, Drug Prohibition:Destroying America to Save It, 27 CONN. L. REV.
613, 616 (1995) ("[D]rug prohibition, by creating a highly profitable criminal market, has funded
individuals, gangs, and organizations that are far more dangerous and commit far more real crimes
than they otherwise would.").
16. 1 discuss several of these police tactics in section I (A)(2)(c). See infra notes 141-76 and
accompanying text. See also, powell & Hershenov, supra note 7, at 581-99 (describing drug
profiling and other police tactics that disproportionately affect the African American community);
Weatherspoon, supra note 2; STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR:
RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 160-71 (1993) (describing negative impact of

drug war practices on African Americans).
17. See, powell & Hershenov, supra note 7, at 581 (arguing that a "war on drugs threatens
property, due process, and privacy rights").
18. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 555, 572 (2000) (reporting that research "consistently shows that Blacks quite
understandably have higher levels of mistrust toward government institutions than most
Americans").
19.

See infra notes 366-470 for a discussion of race and crime as social phenomena.
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In this way, crime can mask racial oppression by allowing it to be represented as
a legitimate response to wrongdoing. At the same time, labeling conduct that is
associated with a particular racial group as criminal can create racial animosity
20
toward that group.
In addition to the role that the definition of crime plays in determining who
is oppressed, crime also defines the limits and form of mainstream law-abiding
society. The definition of crime, then, is eminently political. Consequently, its
manipulation by politicians and citizens' groups alike is a well-known feature of
American political life. For its part, race helps establish the boundaries of
criminality and imbues it with a sense of political urgency. Race provides the
contours of a discourse of threat that supplies the social phenomenon of crime
21
with power and political significance.
The symbiotic relationship between race and crime can be explained further
by reference to a concept I call "the pool of surplus criminality. ''22 This concept
recognizes the cyclical connection of crime-to race-to culture. The concept
of surplus criminality holds that African people constitute a pool of surplus, or
inchoate criminals in the collective psyche of white America. In times of crisis,
when there is a need to reinforce the solidarity of the white community, these
inchoate African American criminals can be turned into fully perceived
wrongdoers. The pool of surplus criminality concept asserts that African
American criminals are needed as scapegoats for problems and threats perceived
by the white community, and are thus essential to the constitution of American
23
culture.
In this article, I use the concept of the pool of surplus criminality to explain
the drug war's focus on African Americans. I argue that faced with a perceived
drug problem, white Americans naturally identified African people as the source
of that threat and targeted them for police harassment and penal control. First, I
point out the ways the drug war may be construed as a race war. 24 I review the
25
drug war's disproportionate impact on the African American community,
evidence that policy makers anticipated the drug war would disproportionately
harm the African American community, 26 and the historic connection between
drugs and racial stereotyping. 27 Next, I explore the connection between race
and crime at the theoretical level. I show how race and crime define and
reinforce each other and the role they play in construction of American

20.

See infra notes 458-70 and accompanying text.

21. See generally, Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle:Black Crime, White FearsOn the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REv. 503 (1994).
22.

See infra notes 471-502 and accompanying text.

23.

See infra notes 471-502 and accompanying text.

24.

See infra notes 31-73 and accompanying text.

25.

See infra notes 74-215 and accompanying text.

26.

See infra notes 216-43 and accompanying text.

27. See infra notes 244-88 and accompanying text.
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culture. 2 8 Finally, I describe the pool of surplus criminality. I show how the
pool of surplus criminality explains why the drug war targeted African
American communities and why, consequently, African Americans will always
30
be treated unfairly by the nation's criminal laws.
I. DRUG WAR AS RACE WAR
The War on Drugs that has been a centerpiece of American foreign and
domestic policy over the past two decades should not be viewed as a war against
a particular collection of inanimate objects. The War on Drugs in this sense is
but a convenient, yet inaccurate, metaphor. Instead the War on Drugs should be
understood as a special case of what war has always been-the employment of
force and violence against certain communities, and/or their institutions, in order
to attain certain political objectives. 3 1 Race has played an important role over
the years in identifying the communities that became the targets of the drug war,
consequently exposing their cultural practices and institutions to military-style
attack and police control. 32 Although the drug war has certainly sought to
eradicate controlled substances and destroy the networks established for their
distribution, this is only part of the story. As I shall explain, state efforts to
33
control drugs are also a way for dominant groups to express racial power.
Before addressing the historical and culturally entrenched connection of drug
control and race, I first want to explore the origins of the most recent round of
American anti-drug policies-the so-called War on Drugs-and examine the
impact of these policies on African American communities.
A. The War on Drugs

1. Origins of the Drug War
34
In October of 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared war on drugs.

28.

See infra notes 365-470 and accompanying text.

29.

See infra notes 471-502 and accompanying text.

30.

See infra notes 503-19 and accompanying text.

31. Black's Law Dictionary defines war as "hostile contention by means of armed forces,
carried on between nations, states or rulers, or between citizens in the same nation or state."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1577 (7th ed. 1999). According to Clausewitz, war is simply "an act of
force to compel our enemy to do our will." CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (M. Howard & P.
Paret eds., 1976).
32. 1 discuss the racial aspect of the War on Drugs vis-A-vis African Americans in section
l(A)(2); See infra notes 74-243 and accompanying text.
33.

See infra notes 292-364 and accompanying text.

34.

See Reagan, In Radio Talk, Vows Drive Against Drugs, N.Y.

TIMES,
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Speaking to the nation in his weekly radio address, Reagan promised a "planned,
concerted campaign" against all drugs-"hard, soft or otherwise. 3 5 Reagan
described his campaign in military terms, using words like "battle," "war," and
"surrender." 36 "[W]e're going to win the war on drugs," he vowed. 37 President
Reagan increased anti-drug spending and increased the number of federal drug
task forces. 3 8 Most importantly, the Reagan administration launched a public
relations campaign designed to change the public perception of drug use and the
threat posed by illegal drugs. 39 The centerpiece of this public relations
campaign was a new rhetorical strategy that sought to demonize drugs and
ostracize drug users. 40 Presidents Bush and Clinton continued the Reagan
administration's anti-drug policies. President Bush established a national office
of drug policy, appointed a drug "czar," increased anti-drug spending and
intensified drug law enforcement efforts. 4 1 President Clinton, for his part,
increased the anti-drug budget by twenty-five percent, proposed expanded drug
42
testing rules and intensified efforts toward drug interdiction and prosecution.
No matter who has occupied the executive branch, the United States has
pursued the same overall policies throughout the drug war.43 Anti-drug policies
can be separated into two general camps, "supply-reduction" and "demandreduction." Supply-reduction strategies seek to reduce the availability of drugs
by limiting access to drug sources and increasing the risks of drug possession
and distribution. 44 Demand-reduction strategies, on the other hand, seek to
45
reduce demand for illegal drugs through drug use prevention and treatment.
The rhetoric of war helped shape the strategies that were used to combat the
35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38. Leslie Maitland, President Gives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1982, at Al.

39. See EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 112 (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1996) (describing the president's anti-drug agenda as an "aggressive public-relations and
legislative campaign").
40. Reagan described the drug threat as the consequence of a "dark, evil enemy within." Id.
This type of language has been described as part of a "rhetorical, multifaceted public relations
campaign designed to enhance the images of specific political figures and to absolve the federal
government of responsibility for resolving problems involved with drug addictions and trade .... "
WILLIAM N. ELWOOD, RHETORIC IN THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES OF

PUBLIC RELATIONS 3 (1994). Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign was perhaps the best-known
part of the Reagan Administration's anti-drug rhetoric. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
41. Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen, Policingfor Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 36 n.4 (1998).

42.

Id.

43.

See id

44.

MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 117

(1995).
45.

Id.
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perceived drug threat. 4 6 The Reagan administration embraced a supplyreduction strategy focusing on interdiction, seizure and criminal prosecution,
rather than a demand-reduction strategy that focused on public education and
drug treatment designed to reduce demand for illegal drugs. 47 The supplyreduction strategy adopted by the Reagan administration fits a war model of the
drug problem. Viewing the drug problem through a war model implies that the
perceived drug problem can be attacked through aggressive law enforcement
measures designed to seek out and destroy contraband and interrupt distribution
networks. These kinds of measures are more analogous to the military tactics
one would expect to see in warfare than are demand-reduction measures, which
are primarily social service based.
According to Michael Tonry, the drug war was "fought largely from
partisan political motives to show that the Bush and Reagan administrations
were concerned about public safety, crime prevention, and the needs of
victims." 4 8 While the drug war may have been initiated out of political motives,
this assessment does not tell the entire tale.

To understand the origins of the

War on Drugs in its entirety, we must know what was going on in the cultural

landscape that made it politically advantageous to fight a war on drugs.
When Reagan declared war on drugs, a broad cultural change was
underway in the United States. 4 9

The country was moving from a period of

relative liberalism that included skepticism toward government and authority
and an emphasis on personal freedoms, to a period of relative conservatism that

included respect for government and authority and an emphasis on personal
responsibility.

Reagan's very election to the presidency was in large part a

manifestation of this shift in attitudes. 5 1

Reagan was the embodiment of a

mainstream reaction to the counterculture of the 60s and 70s. 5 2 Part of this sea

46. "War" is a powerful and evocative symbol.
Elwood describes the term as a
"condensation symbol," that is, a term that condenses complex and expansive categories of
connected meaning into an emotionally charged emblem. See ELWOOD, supra note 40, at 4. See
also Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and CapitalPunishment: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW
& POL'Y REV. 157, 161 (1983) (describing condensation symbols as "highly condensed forms of
substitutive behavior, requiring no check with reality"). War, as a condensation symbol, "connotes
heroes and enemies, battles and battlefields, and war-sized allocations of resources to guarantee
ultimate victory over the enemy." ELWOOD, supranote 40, at 5.
47.

See TONRY, supra note 44, at 83, 121.

48.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 82.

49. See BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 39, at 110-12 (describing how the social and political
climate and patterns of drug use were changing as Reagan took office).
50. See id. at 110-11 ("[Reagan's] drug policy agenda was shaped by a sizable and vocal
national constituency that had grown impatient with the permissive attitude toward drug abuse and
other counter cultural activities of the previous decade.").
51. See JOEL KRIEGER, REAGAN, THATCHER AND THE POLITICS OF DECLINE 134-35 (1986)
(crediting Reagan's electoral success to a movement of socially conservative middle-class
Americans).
52. See BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 39, at 111 ("At the center of... [Reagan's] domestic
agenda was a set of social policies, articulated most powerfully by the so-called moral majority,
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53
change in cultural attitudes was a different perspective toward drugs.
In 1982, when the drug war began, the recreational use of illegal drugs was
in decline. 54 Tonry points out that in 1982, surveys conducted by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse showed significant drops in drug usage over long
periods for a wide range of age groups. 55 This decline impacted the use of both
legal and illegal substances. For example, the percentages of respondents 18 to
25 years of age reporting marijuana use during the preceding year dropped by
approximately 15% between 1979 and 1982, and continued to decline sharply
throughout the decade of the 80s. 56 Reported use of cocaine by the same age
group also dropped by approximately 15% between 1979 and 1982, and
continued to decline throughout the decade. 57 Finally, 18 to 25 year olds who
reported using alcohol during the preceding year rose only slightly from 1979 to
1982, but also declined sharply following a peak in 1985.58 According to
Tonry, these statistics "signal a broadly based and widely shared change in
American attitudes toward the ingestion of dangerous or unhealthy substances
that can have little to do with the deterrent effects of law enforcement strategies
or criminal sanctions." 59 Consequently, Reagan's declaration of war tapped into
a growing public sentiment against illegal drug use.
Many citizens viewed
drugs as a menace and many of these same citizens
were
readily supportive of
61
Reagan's proposals to address the drug problem.
This widespread public support explains the political value of the War on
Drugs. The cultural environment created virtually unanimous bi-partisan
support for an extensive and costly intervention into the world of drugs. 62 Both
Republicans and Democrats sought to exploit the public sentiment against

which embodied a defense of traditional family values, conservative Christian morality, and
patriotism.").
53.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 91.

54.

Id. at 83.

55. See id at 84-90 (reporting various surveys showing decline in usage of alcohol,
marijuana, cigarettes, cocaine, and heroin).
56.

Id. at 89.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 90.

59.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 91.

60. See WITSOTSKY, supra note 1, at 4 (asserting there was a "growing social consensus that
illegal drug use had gotten out of hand").
61. ELWOOD, supra note 40, at 21. According to Elwood: "The War on Drugs is one
initiative that citizens accepted. It looked good in headlines, and it positively influenced public
opinion ratings of Ronald and Nancy Reagan and of George Bush." Id.
62. Morgan Cloud writes that: "Historical and political constraints have predisposed
Congress to emphasize programs consistent with the traditional law enforcement model of drug
control. These forces have led Congress to support the well-publicized, well-entrenched, and
politically popular law enforcement apparatus that has flourished in the 'war on drugs."' A. Morgan
Cloud, III, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible Convergence of Rational
Theory and NationalPolicy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 801 (1989).
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drugs. 63 The drug war also fostered a remarkable level of cooperation between
the executive and legislative branches. 64 In response to Reagan administration
proposals, Congress quickly moved to pass and fund tough drug enforcement
initiatives. 6 5 Fueled by political considerations, the drug war took on a life of
its own. For each anti-drug measure that passed, it became necessary to further
escalate the war so that no one, Democrat or Republican, executive or legislative
66
branch, could be called soft on this critical issue.
In addition to shaping the methods used to address the drug problem, the
rhetoric of war also shaped the impact of those methods, for a war requires not
only military strategies, but an enemy as well. For the constituency the Reagan
Administration was trying to reach, it was easy to construct African Americans,
Hispanics, and other people of color as the enemy in the War on Drugs. 67 These
are the groups that the majority of white Americans have always viewed as the
sources of vice and crime. 6 8 Reagan's anti-drug rhetoric was skillfully designed

63. See Nkechi Taifa, Cracked Justice: A Critical Examination of Cocaine Sentencing, 27
UWLA L. REV. 109, 120-21 (describing how both Republicans and Democrats sought to rush
through legislation enacting stiff cocaine penalties for political advantage).

64. See, e.g., WITSOTSKY, supra note 1, at 4 (claiming Reagan's anti-drug initiatives "drew
energy from a broad base of political support").
65.

According to Witsotsky:

Congress itself soon became a beehive of activity in support of the War on Drugs.
First, the Administration persuaded Congress to enact all of its "legislative offensive"
toughening the laws governing bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, and the
exclusionary rule. Second, Congress was called upon to finance the war, and it
responded in the first year of the war with a special appropriation that gave the
Administration 100 percent of what it had requested in addition to the regular fiscal
1983 drug enforcement budget.
Id.
66. See Ross C. "Rocky" Anderson, We are all Casualtiesof Friendly Fire in the War on
Drugs, 13 UTAH B. J. 10-11 (Nov. 2000) (arguing that "our nation's leaders have spent billions of
taxpayer dollars on a strategy focused on the supply side, rather than on the demand side, simply
because Republicans and Democrats alike are terrified of appearing to be soft on crime."); Peter
Reuter, Truce in Needle Park; Time to End the Drug War, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at CO1.
67. Both Reagan and Bush sought to exploit latent racist fears of the white majority. As
Elwood states:
Voters in the Reagan-Bush coalition typically are concerned about crime, specifically
urban crime; and as Edsall and Edsall discuss, both officeholders were skilled in using
rhetoric that blamed social ills on minorities without communicating a sense of racism
to white constituents. Hence, presidential drug war declarations make oblique
references to housing projects and to urban areas and the people who live there.
ELWOOD, supra note 40, at 11.
68. Gunnar Myrdal wrote in his classic study of American race relations, An American
Dilemma (first published in 1944), that "whites believe the Negro to be innately addicted to crime."
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
655 (20th anniv. ed. 1962). More recent public opinion data discloses that the connection of African
Americans to criminal behavior endures in white culture. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text:
Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the
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to tap into deeply held cultural attitudes about people of color and their links to
drug use and other illicit behavior. 69 According to mass communications
scholar William Elwood, Reagan's rhetorical declaration of a war on drugs had a
deliberate political effect. In Elwood's view, "Such rhetoric allows presidents to
appear as strong leaders who are tough on crime and concerned about domestic
issues and is strategically ambiguous to portray urban minorities as responsible
for problems related to the drug war and for resolving such problems." 7° Thus,
the origins of the drug war can be traced to shifting public attitudes toward drugs
in the early 1980s. President Reagan sought to exploit this change in attitude
71
through a public relations campaign that promised to wage "war on drugs.
As the metaphor of war might suggest, the War on Drugs required both weapons
and enemies. A punitive law enforcement policy of prohibition and interdiction
provided the weapons and, while the professed enemies of the War on Drugs
of
were drug cartels in drug source countries, 72 those most affected were people
73
color in inner city neighborhoods, chiefly African Americans and Hispanics.
2. How the Drug War Targeted Black Communities
By almost any measure, the drug war's impact on African American
communities has been devastating. Millions of African Americans have been
imprisoned, many have been unfairly treated by the criminal justice system, the
rights of both legitimate suspects and average citizens have been violated and
the quality of life of many millions more has been adversely affected. These
effects are the consequences of deliberate decisions; first, to fight a "war" on
drugs, and second, to fight that war against low-level street dealers in
communities populated by people of color. In this section, I consider the impact
of the War on Drugs specifically on the African American community.
a. Mass Incarcerationand DisproportionateArrests

As a result of the War on Drugs, African American communities suffer

Public Defender and a Proposalfor Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 770 n.142 (1995) (citing
survey) [hereinafter Nunn, Trial as Text].

69. See ELWOOD, supra note 40, at 11 (noting that "presidential drug war declarations make
oblique references to housing projects and to urban areas and the people who live there" while not
mentioning drug problems among white affluent people).
70.

Id.

71.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

72. See CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, International Legal Mechanisms for Combating
TransnationalOrganized Crime. The Need Fora Multinational Convention, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 53, 59 (2000) (describing Columbian cartels as "the main enemy in the United States' war on

drugs").
73.

See infra notes 74-215.
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from a phenomenon I call "mass incarceration." 74 Not only are large numbers
of African Americans incarcerated, African Americans are incarcerated at
percentages that exceed any legitimate law enforcement interest and which
negatively impact the African American community. 75 While African
Americans only comprise twelve percent of the U.S. population, 76 they are
forty-six percent of those incarcerated in state and federal prisons. 77 At the end
of 1999, over half a million African American men and women were held in
state and federal prisons. 78 A disparity this great appears inexcusable on its
face. However, the inequity is even worse when one considers the rate of
incarceration and the proportion of the African American population that is
incarcerated.
The rate of incarceration measures the likelihood that any African
American male will be sentenced to prison. In 2000, the rate of incarceration for
African American males nationwide was 3457 per 100,000. In comparison, the
rate of incarceration for white males was 449 per 100,000. 79 This means, on
average, African American males were 7.7 times more likely to be incarcerated
than white males. 80 For some age groups, the racial disparities are even worse.
For young men between the ages of 25 and 29, African Americans are 8.7 times
more likely to be incarcerated than whites. 8 1 For 18 and 19 year olds, African
82
American men are 8.8 times more likely to be incarcerated than whites.
Another way to measure the extent of mass incarceration is to examine the
proportion of the African American population that is serving time in prison. In
some jurisdictions, as many as one third of the adult African American male
population may be incarcerated at any given time. 83 Nationwide, 1.6 % of the

74. I define mass incarceration as the imprisonment of a percentage of the population greater
than that necessary to accomplish valid penal goals. Mass incarceration may be used for purposes of
genocide, group oppression or repressive social control. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice
and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005,
1007-8 (2001) (arguing that "the government can use mass incarceration as a tool of state
repression").
75. See Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 705, 707 (1999) (arguing that the criminal justice system is unjust because disproportionate
numbers of African Americans are incarcerated for crimes they do not disproportionately commit).
76.

African Americans comprise 34,658,190 out of 281,421,906 U.S. residents.

CENSUS BUREAU, RACE-UNIVERSE: TOTAL POPULATION,

CENSUS 2000, tbl.P3,

U.S.

available at

http://factfinder.census.gov.
77. ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2000, at 11 (2001) [HEREINAFTER PRISONERS IN 2000].

78.

Id. attbl.16.

79. In 2000, the Black rate of incarceration was 3457 per 100,000, or 7.69 times the white
male rate of 449 per 100,000. Id.
80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

If we broaden the category to include persons under any kind of criminal justice
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African American population is inprison. 84 However, nearly 10% of African
8% of African American
American males ages 25-29 are in prison. 85 Nearly
86
males between the ages of 18 and 39 are in prison.
The mass incarceration of African Americans is a direct consequence of the
War on Drugs. As one commentator states, "Drug arrests are a principal reason
that the proportions of [B]lacks in prison and more generally under criminal
Since the
justice system control have risen rapidly in recent years.' 87
declaration of the War on Drugs in 1982, prison populations have more than

tripled. 88 The rapid growth in prison populations is particularly clear in federal
institutions. Although the overall federal prison population was only 24,000 in
1980, by 1996, it had reached 106,000. 89 The federal prison population
continued to grow in the 1990s. In 2000, the federal prison population exceeded
Fifty-seven percent of the federal prisoners in 2000 were
145,000.90
incarcerated for drug offenses. 9 1 In 1982 there were approximately 400,000
incarcerated persons. 92 By 1992, that number had more than doubled to
850,000. 93 In 2000, there were over 1.3 million persons in prison. 94 From 1979
to 1989, the percentage of African Americans arrested for drug offenses almost

supervision (probation, jail, prison or parole), an even starker picture appears. One study has found
that almost one quarter of African American males between the ages of 20 and 29 nationwide are
incarcerated, on probation, or on parole. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1
(Oct. 1995). In some urban areas, almost 60% of young Black males are under criminal justice
supervision. MILLER, WASHINGTON, D.C., supranote 4 (reporting 42% of African American males
in ages 18-35 in D.C. are involved in the criminal justice system); MILLER, BALTIMORE, supra note
4 (finding 56% of African American males ages 18-35 in Baltimore are incarcerated, on probation,
or on parole).
84.

US CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 76; PRISONERS IN 2000, supranote 77, at 11 tbl. 16.

85.

The actual figure is 9.7%. PRISONERS IN 2000, supra note 77, at 11.

86. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table PI2B, Sex by Age (Black or African American Alone),
available
at
1
(SF1),
Summary
File
Census
2000
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_ts=298; PRISONERS IN 2000, supra note 77, at 11
tbl.15.
87. TONRY, supra note 44, at 110. Indeed, statistics from the Department of Justice disclose
that the probability of receiving a prison sentence after being arrested for a drug offense increased by
447% between 1980 and 1992. ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. GILLIARD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 13 (Aug. 1995).
88.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1980-2000, available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/[glance/tables/corr2tab.htm
POPULATIONS].

[hereinafter

CORRECTIONAL

89. Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge's Dilemma, 23 LAW
SOC. INQUIRY 823, 835 (1998).
90.

PRISONERS IN 2000, supranote 77, at 1.

91.

Id. at 13.

92.

See CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra,note 88.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.
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doubled from 22% to 42% of the total. 95 During that same period, the total
number of African American arrests for drug abuse violations skyrocketed from
112,748 to 452,574, an increase of over 300 %.96
Jerome Miller analyzed arrest statistics from several American cities to
determine the impact of the War on Drugs on policing. 97 He found striking
racial disparities in how drug arrests were made. In many jurisdictions, African
American men account for over eighty percent of total drug arrests. 9 8

In

Baltimore, for example, African American men were eighty-six percent of those
arrested for drug offenses in 1991. 99 The fact that African Americans are
incarcerated in such large percentages and are arrested and incarcerated at such
disproportionate rates is shocking. It is obscene in the absence of a strong
showing that African Americans are responsible for a comparable percentage of
10 0
crime in the United States.

95.

TONRY, supranote 44, at 109 tbl.3-3.

96.

Id.

97.

JEROME

G. MILLER,

SEARCH

AND DESTROY:

AFRICAN-AMERICAN

MALES IN THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 82 (1996) [hereinafter MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY].

98.

Id.

99.

Id. Miller's analysis revealed gross disparities in many other cities:
In Columbus, Ohio, where African-American males made up less than II percent of
the population, they comprised over 90 percent of the drug arrests and were being
arrested at 18 times the rate of whites. In Jacksonville, Florida, 87 percent of those
arrested on drug charges were African-American males, even though they comprised
only 12 percent of that county's population. In Minneapolis... though [B]lack men
only made up only about 7 percent of the population, they were being arrested at a
ratio of approximately 20:1 to white males. These patterns were repeated across the
nation.

Id.
100. Some commentators have indeed suggested the racial disparities that exist in the
criminal justice system are due to racial differences in rates of offending, or in other words, that
African Americans commit more crimes. See, e.g., WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM vii (1987) (claiming that evidence of racism in the criminal justice
system is weak and contradictory).
But these claims have been vigorously contested by
criminologists who point out problems with the assumptions, methodology, and data being offered to
prove differential offending. See, e.g., CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION
OF COLOR 32-35 (1993) (attacking statistics purporting to show African Americans commit more
crimes as inflated due to: (1)over-reporting of crimes committed by African Americans; (2) the
over-policing of Black communities; (3) counting multiple charges against a single individual as
multiple arrests; and (4) undercounting the Black population so the per capita rate of crime appears
to be higher); DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM 149-51 (1999) (tracing
racially discriminatory to three problems:
offenders are similarly situated or not;
possibility that studies of disparities at
occurred at earlier stages).

disagreement over whether the criminal justice system is
(1) a lack of consensus over whether Black and non-Black
(2) disagreement over relevant control factors (3) the
one stage of the process may miss discrimination that

See also SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE,

ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 99-100 (2000) (acknowledging controversy over the cause of
racial disparities and discussing studies contesting the conclusion that more African Americans are
arrested due to their greater involvement in crime); Paul Knepper, The Alchemy of Race and Crime
Research, in THE SYSTEM INBLACK AND WHITE 15-27 (Michael W. Markowitz & Delores D. JonesBrown eds., 2000) (claiming the question of Black extracriminality is unanswerable because "there
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The claim that African Americans violate the drug laws at a greater rate,
and that this justifies the great disparities in rates of arrest and incarceration,
10 1
seems unlikely. Most drug arrests are made for the crime of possession.
Possession is a crime that every drug user must commit and, in the United
States, most drug users are white. 102 The U.S. Public Health Service Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration reported in 1992 that 76% of
drug users in the United States were white, 14% were African American, and
8% were Hispanic. 10 3 Cocaine users were estimated to be 66% white, 17.6%
Black, and 15.9% Hispanic. 104 Rather than demonstrating patterns of use that
approach arrest disparities, African Americans "are less likel, to ...[use] drugs
than whites are, for all major drugs of abuse except heroin."
There also seems to be insufficient evidence to conclude that African
Americans are more likely to deal drugs, and thus more likely to be arrested.
Most drug users purchase drugs from persons of the same race and socioeconomic background. 106 So, the large numbers of white users would suggest
an equally large number of white dealers, as well. On the other hand, there are
logical reasons to conclude that the number of African American dealers may be
disproportionately large. 10 7 Still, it is unlikely that drug use and offense are so
out of balance that Blacks constitute the vast majority of drug offenders given
that they are such a small minority of drug users.
Disproportionate enforcement is a more likely cause of racial disparities in
the criminal justice system than is disproportionate offending. Differences in
the way that Black dealers and white dealers market drugs may encourage law
enforcement officers to concentrate efforts against African Americans. Michael
Tonry argues that it is easier for police to make arrests in "socially disorganized

is no statistical alchemy in which the government's crime statistics can be made to yield meaningful,
social scientific information about the criminality of races or race discrimination"); Nunn, Darden
Dilemma, supra note 13, at 1487 (citing sources demonstrating that the claim of disproportionate
offending by Blacks is overstated).
101. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 2000, at 216
tbl.4.1 (2000) (showing possession crimes constitute 81% of all drug arrests).
102. The United States Sentencing Commission reported in 1995 that of the persons
reporting cocaine use within the year, 75% were white, 15% were Black and 10% Hispanic. UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,

SPECIAL

REPORT TO CONGRESS:

COCAINE AND FEDERAL

SENTENCING POLICY 34 (1995).
103.

Id.

104.

MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY, supranote 97, at 81.

105.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 108 (emphasis added).

106.

K.

JACK RILEY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRACK POWDER COCAINE AND

HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND USE PATTERNS INSiX U.S. CITIES 1 (Dec. 1997).
107. As one commentator has remarked: "Drug dealing may or may not be a
disproportionately minority enterprise. Poverty, lack of education, and racial discrimination do tend
to channel racial minorities into the drug trade for lack of other opportunities. And among users,
minorities may be more likely to turn to dealing to finance their habits because they lack other
means of earning a living." Provine, supra note 89, at 836.
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108
neighborhoods" because drug dealing is more likely to occur on the streets
109
and transient drug buyers are less likely to draw attention to themselves.
In addition, disproportionate arrests may simply be a function of
discriminatory exercise of discretion by police officers. 110 Police officers may
decide to arrest African Americans under circumstances when they would not
arrest white suspects, and they may be in a position to do so more frequently
than with whites because they are more likely to stop and detain African
Americans. ' II

b. Crack Cocaine and Sentencing Disparities
Perhaps no aspect of the drug war has contributed to the rapid increase of
African American prisoners in federal prisons more than the federal cocaine
sentencing scheme. Federal sentencing rules for the possession and sale of
cocaine distinguish between cocaine in powder form and cocaine prepared as
crack. 112 A person sentenced for possession with intent to distribute a given
amount of crack cocaine receives the same sentence as someone who possessed
one hundred times as much powder cocaine. 113 This difference in sentencing
exists notwithstanding the fact that cocaine is cocaine, and there are no
physiological differences in effect between the powder and the crack form of the
114
drug.
The difference in crack/powder cocaine sentencing is significant because

108. TONRY, supra note 44, at 105-06. Alfred Blumstein also makes this point. As
Blumstein describes it: "Markets operated by blacks tend much more often to be outdoors and
vulnerable to police action, while markets operated by whites tend much more often to be
clandestine and indoors, and thereby less visible and more protected from police surveillance and
arrest." Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionalityof U.S. Prison PopulationsRevisited, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 743, 753 (1993).
109.

TONRY, supranote 44, at 106. Tonry explains:

[lI]t is easier for undercover narcotic agents to penetrate networks of friends and
acquaintances in poor urban minority neighborhoods than in more stable and closely
knit working-class and middle-class neighborhoods. The stranger buying drugs on the
urban street comer or in an alley or overcoming local suspicions by hanging around for
a few days and then buying drugs, is commonplace.
Id. See also William J. Stunz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998) (suggesting
police focus on street sales in lower income areas because it is cheaper to do so).
110.

See infra notes 140-76 and accompanying text.

111. See WALKER ET AL., supra note 100, at 100 (discussing studies showing African
Americans more likely to be arrested on less stringent evidentiary criteria than whites); Angela J.
Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the CriminalJustice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1660-61
(1996) (describing how three white adults found smoking crack cocaine in a car with a baby were
released by police without arrest) [hereinafter Davis, Benign Neglect].
112. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1994) (describing penalties for possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute).
113.

Id.

114.

See Taifa, supranote 63, at 129-37.
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African Americans are more likely to use crack, while white drug users are more
likely to use powder cocaine. 115 Since the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986,116 which first enacted the crack/powder sentencing disparity, virtually
all federal cocaine prosecutions have been against African Americans charged
with the possession or sale of crack cocaine. 117 Although, the disproportionate
racial impact of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 has been noted by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 118 neither Congress
nor the executive branch has
119
moved to rectify the disparities in the law.
The disparity in cocaine sentencing is obvious and may be traced to the
language of the underlying statute. 12 Even in the absence of such a manifest
cause of discrimination, African Americans have traditionally received more
severe sentences than similarly situated whites.121 Although it is by no means
conclusive, 122 there is substantial evidence that racial discrimination within the
criminal justice system is the cause of the sentencing disparities that exist
between Blacks and whites. 123 Numerous surveys have found racial disparities

115.

Id.atl2l-28.

116. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841).
117. Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion in US. v. Armstrong, that while whites
represented 65% of crack cocaine users, they made up only 4% of the federal defendants charged
with trafficking in crack. U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 479-80 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Eighty-eight percent of crack distribution prosecutions were directed against African Americans. Id.
Between 1996 and 2000, the percentage of white crack distribution defendants averaged 5.6% while
the percentage of Black crack distribution defendants averaged 84.8%. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 47 (1997) and Sourcebooks
for the years 1997-2000.
118. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 8 (1997) (noting "sentences appear to be harsher and more
severe for racial minorities as a result of this law").
119. See Taifa, supra note 63, at 111-17 (describing how Congress failed to act on the
Sentencing Commission's recommendation that sentencing for crack and powder cocaine be
equalized and how President Clinton failed to veto congressional legislation re-enacting the 100 to 1
crack/powder differential).
120. See id., at 122, quoting DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E.CARLSON, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? 2 (1993) ("[If legislation
and guidelines were changed so that crack and powdered cocaine traffickers were sentenced
identically for the same weight of cocaine, this study's analysis suggests that the Black/White
difference in sentences for cocaine trafficking would not only evaporate, but it would slightly
reverse.").
121. Researchers have found racial disparities in criminal sentencing since the first studies
were conducted in the 1930's. See WALKER ET AL., supranote 100, at 186 ("Studies conducted from
the 1930s through the 1960s often concluded that racial disparities in sentencing were due to racial
discrimination").
122.

See COLE, supra note 100, at 149-50 (claiming results are mixed).

123. See generally, Developments in the Law: Race andthe CriminalProcess, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1525-29 (1988) (describing studies showing race discrimination in
criminal sentencing); RICHEY MANN, supra note 100, at 191-200 (describing sentencing
studies and summarizing findings).
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in the sentencing process and attributed those disparities to racial discrimination.
For example, a study by Miethe and Moore in 1984 found that African
Americans received longer sentences than whites and that African Americans
124
were less likely to benefit from lower sentences as a result of plea-bargaining.
Likewise, Welch, Spohn, and Gruhl reviewed convictions and sentences in six
cities nationwide in 1985.125 They found that African Americans were
substantially more likely to be sentenced to prison than whites and that the
disparity in incarceration rates is due to "discrimination in the sentencing
process itself."126 In 1983, Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth subjected death
sentences in Georgia to painstaking review. 127 Using multiple regression
analysis to control for over 230 nonracial factors, the researchers found that the
race of the victim was the determining factor in whether a defendant received
the death penalty. 128 They found defendants who killed white victims were over
four times more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants whose
victims were not white. 12 9 In addition, African American defendants who killed
whites were eleven times more likely to receive a death sentence than white
130
defendants who killed Blacks.
Racial discrimination in sentencing can only be worsened by efforts to
make sentences tougher and harsher.
The War on Drugs has spawned a
panoply of "get tough on crime" measures such as "three strikes and you're

124. See Terence D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Racial Difference in Criminal Court
Sentencing Decisions: The Consequences of Model Selection on Conclusions about Differential
Treatment, 27 SOc. Q. 217 (1986).
125. Susan Welch et al., Convicting and Sentencing: Differences among Black, Hispanic
and White Males in Six Localities, 2 JUSTICE QTR. 67 (1985).

126.

Id. at 75.

127. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the GeorgiaExperience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).
128. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1397 (1988). The Baldus team marshaled one of the most
compelling collections of sentencing data ever compiled by social scientists. See id. at 1396 (calling
the Baldus study "the most comprehensive analysis to date of racial influences in capital sentencing
in a single state"). Although, the Supreme Court accepted the validity of the Baldus study's data, the
Court nevertheless concluded that statistical evidence alone was not sufficient to establish that racial
discrimination had occurred in the Georgia capital sentencing process. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 297 (1987). For a vigorous critique of the McCleskey holding, see Kennedy, supra at
1408-21 (arguing McCleskey decision is ill-reasoned and doctrinally unsound).
129.

Kennedy, supra note 128, at 1398.

130.

McCleskey,481 U.S. at286.

131. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 136 (1999). Mauer pointed out that terrible
consequences were likely to come from harsher drug laws given pre-existing racial disparities: "With
African Americans already representing 40 percent of the prison population in 1970, a doubling of
the prison population was likely to have a substantial impact on the absolute number of imprisoned
minorities, absent some dramatic changes in crime rates or criminal justice processing decisions."
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out",132 and habitual offender provisions, 133 as well as enhancements for
possession of weapons 1 34 and for selling drugs near schools or public
housing. 135 The cumulative effect of these sentencing policies has been to
increase the proportion of convicted drug dealers sentenced to prison and
increase the length of their sentences. 136 A substantial increase in length of
sentence for drug offenders is precisely what Marc Mauer found when 137
he
system.
court
federal
the
in
sentences
mandatory
of
impact
the
analyzed
Mauer observed:
Drug offenders released from prison in 1990, many of whom had not
been sentenced under mandatory provisions, had served an average of
30 months in prison. But offenders sentenced to prison in 1990-most
of whom were subject to mandatory penalties-were ex!ected to serve
more than twice that term, or an average of 66 months.l18
Guideline sentencing has also contributed to the increase in African
Americans incarcerated as a result of the drug war. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, by depriving judges of discretion, have resulted in many more
defendants serving substantially longer sentences. 139 This combined with the
fact that African Americans in general usually get longer sentences than

132. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 11170.12 (1996) (California Career Criminal
Punishment Act); See generally Andrade v. California, 270 F.3d 743, 762-66 (2001), cert. granted
sub nom. Lockyer v. Andrade, 122 S.Ct. 1434 (2002) (declaring California's three strike law
unconstitutional as applied and discussing three strikes laws of other states); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2000);
Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 89 (2001).
133. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762 (noting many states have laws that punish recidivists
more severely than first time offenders).
134. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (requiring at least 5 years consecutive sentence if
defendant "uses or carries" a fireman "during and in relation to" any crime of violence). See
generally Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving
Firearms:Recent Changes and Prospectsfor Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41 (2000).
135. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-4(6)(a), (7)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998)
(providing enhanced sentences for selling drugs within 1000 feet of school). See generally Gary T.
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing
Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 70-71 (1993). Other common sentencing enhancement provisions
include enhancements for repeat felony offenders, offenses committed against vulnerable victims,
possession of specified amounts of prohibited drugs, and offenses committed while released from
custody. See id. at 70-71, notes 38, 40, and 41.
136. MAUER, supranote 131, at 151.
137.

Id.

138.

Id. at 151-52.

139.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E.
CARLSON, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATrER? 1 (1993); Gerald W.
Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161
(1991).
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comparably situated whites, 14 means that drug war sentencing has been
particularly unkind to African Americans.
c. Driving While Black, Drug Sweeps and the Overpolicing of the African
American Community
The gross disparities that exist in the criminal justice system may be traced
to the differential treatment that African Americans and other people of color
receive from the police. 14 1 A growing body of evidence suggests that Blacks
are investigated and detained by the police more frequently than are other
persons in the community. 142 This unwarranted attention from the police is a
result of the longstanding racism that pervades American culture. Like all who
are socialized in American culture, police officers are more suspicious 143
of
African Americans and believe they are more likely to engage in crime.
Consequently, police concentrate their efforts in areas frequented
by African
14 4
Americans and detain African Americans at a greater rate.
In part, this concentration of effort may be designed to uncover specific
illegal activity. Certain police activity, such as undercover drug buys, may 14be5
more frequent in African American communities than in other areas of a city.
As a consequence, a disproportionate number of African American drug dealers
may be arrested, leading to racial disparities in drug prosecutions and
sentencing. 146 To the extent that the concentration of investigation and arrests
in African American communities exceeds that in white communities, without
reason to believe that African Americans offend at a greater rate than whites,
then such practices amount to unjustified "over-policing." 147 Over-policing
may also occur when the police concentrate their efforts not on illegal activity,
but on legitimate citizen behavior with the hope that in the process of
investigation some evidence of crime may be uncovered. 148 This kind of overpolicing is what occurs when police conduct drug sweeps in Black
neighborhoods and detain African American motorists for "driving while
140.

See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.

141.

See Nunn, Darden Dilemma, supra note 13, at 1489-91.

142.

Id. at 1489-90.

143. See supra notes 8-9, see also WALKER ET AL., supra note 100, at 104 (describing how
police officers use race as a "cue" to determine whom to stop).
144. WALKER ET AL., supra note 100, at 101 (reporting that racial and ethnic minorities are
disproportionately stopped and questioned by the police).
145.

See supra, notes 109-11 and accompanying text.

146.

See id

147. Cf Jeremiah E. Goulka, A New Stategy for Human Rights Protection: Learningfrom
Narcotics Trafficking in Mexico, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 231, 235 (2001)(describing
"overpolicing" as an "overzealous response" to crime which ignores the rights of suspects and the
accused).
148.

Cf id.
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Black."
"Driving while Black" refers to the police practice of using the traffic laws
to routinely stop and detain Black motorists for the investigation of crime in the
absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the stop. 15 There is
reason to believe that this is a widespread practice performed by police officers
throughout the nation. 15 1 Many prominent African Americans have reported
being victimized by these stops. 152 Although they have unfortunately become
routine, "[s]uch stops and detentions are by their very nature invasive and
intrusive." 153
The intrusive and invasive practice of detaining African American
motorists without cause has occurred in other contexts as well. 154 "Driving
while Black" is essentially a type of racial profiling. 155 People have claimed to
be the victims of racial profiling while walking on the street, 156 shopping or
strolling through department stores and malls, 15 7 seeking entry into
buildings, 158 traveling through airports, 159 or passing through immigration
checkpoints. 16° In all of these situations, African Americans are subjected to
police harassment and denied the freedom of movement to which other citizens
are entitled.
Perhaps the most egregious intrusion into the rights of African Americans

149. For general treatments of the phenomenon of "Driving while Black," see Angela J.
Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Cops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997) [hereinafter Davis, Race,
Cops, and Traffic Cops]; David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997)
[hereinafter Harris, Driving While Black]; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:
Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) [hereinafter Harris, The Stories,
the Statistics, and the Law]; Katheryn K. Russell, "DrivingWhile Black": Corollary Phenomena and
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 (1999); KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK:
HIGHWAYS SHOPPING MALLS, TAXICABS, SIDEWALKS: HOW TO FIGHT BACK IF YOU ARE A VICTIM
OF RACIAL PROFILING (2000).

150.

Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supranote 149, at 265.

151.

Id.

152.

id.

153.

Davis, Benign Neglect, supra, note 11, at 1676.

154. See MEEKS, supra note 149, at 3-20, 63-157 (discussing racial profiling in a variety of
settings and describing the reactions of its victims).
155. Racial profiling occurs when an individual is targeted for criminal investigation based
primarily or solely on racial or ethnic characteristics. See Silton, supra note 2, at 58-60 (offering
both broad and narrow definitions of racial profiling).
156.

See MEEKS, supranote 149, at 3-20.

157.

Id.

158.

Id.

159.

Id.

160. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Racial Profilingin Immigration Enforcement,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 688-706 (2000) (describing racial profiling at immigration checkpoints and
in other immigration related contexts).
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occurs during so-called "drug sweeps." "Drug sweeps" or "street sweeps" occur
when the police simply close off a neighborhood and indiscriminately detain or
arrest large numbers of people without lawful justification. 161 Police conduct
street sweeps in order to subject those caught in the dragnet to questioning and
searches in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 162 One such
drug sweep, which occurred in New York City, was described in the following
account:
In a publicized sweep on July 19, 1989, the Chief of the Organized
Crime Control Bureau (OCCB), led 150 officers to a block in upper
Manhattan's Washington Heights. Police sealed off the block and
detained virtually all of the 100 people who were present there for up
to two hours, during which time the police taped numbers on the
chests of those arrested, took their pictures and had them viewed by
undercover officers. By the end of the operation, police made only 24
felony and two misdemeanor arrests... which strongly suggests there
163
was no probable cause to seize those who were arrested.
African Americans have long had to suffer police harassment and disregard
for their rights. 164 However, the drug war made the types of police harassment
described above more likely to occur. 165 One of the key consequences of the
War on Drugs is that courts have relaxed their oversight of the police. 166 In a
series of decisions written since the declaration of war on drugs, the Supreme
Court has made it easier for the police to establish grounds to stop and detain

161.
(1993).

Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1952

162. See powell & Hershenov, supranote 7, at 613 ("During street sweeps, law enforcement
authorities routinely engage in mass indiscriminate arrests without probable cause").
163. Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street Level Drug
Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 817 n.137
(1990).
164. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
839 (1994) (noting that during the 19"h and most of the 20"h centuries, police forces "treated blacks
and black communities with extraordinary harshness, while often ignoring, and sometimes actively
encouraging illegal white-on-black violence"); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some
Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter? 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
243, 264 n.83 (1991) (describing the brutality suffered by Black men at the hands of the police as
"legendary"); Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism to My People, N.Y. TIMES, January 23, 1989, at
A25 (arguing that "[o]perating free of constitutional limitations, the police have long been the
greatest nemesis of blacks").
165. See Steven A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment
(As Illustratedby the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4, 23 (1986) (arguing that the
War on Drugs is eroding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
166. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 7, at 578-85 (claiming that "the retreat from the
Fourth Amendment.. [has] made all of us, but particularly African-Americans, fair game for police
harassment");Paul Finkleman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993) (describing how the War on Drugs has reduced judicial oversight of
the police).
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motorists and pedestrians on the street. 167 In particular, two recent decisions
have made it virtually impossible for African Americans to move freely on the
16 8
streets without police intervention and harassment.
In Whren v. United States,169 the Supreme Court held that an officer's
subjective motivations for a stop were irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis,
and that the legitimacy of the stop should solely be determined by an objective
analysis of the totality of the circumstances. 170 Under Whren, so long as an
officer can offer an "objective" reason for a detention or arrest, it does not matter
whether the officer's "real" reason for the stop was racist. 17 1 In Illinois v.
Wardlow,172 the Supreme Court ruled that the flight of a middle-aged Black
man from a caravan of Chicago police officers provided reasonable suspicion
for his detention and search. 173 In the majority's view, African Americans have
no legitimate reason to flee the police. 174 Thus, the Court, in essence,
established a per se rule that flight equals reasonable suspicion. 175 As Professor
167. See David A. Moran, The New FourthAmendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search
Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 817 (2002) (arguing "the Supreme Court, largely in
support of the [W]ar on [D]rugs... [has] significantly limited" Fourth Amendment protections and
allowed "the police to stop and search any vehicle at any time"); Frank Rudy Cooper, The UnBalanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47
VILL. L. REV. 851, 893-94 (2002) (arguing courts have reduced Fourth Amendment protections
against searches and seizures in order to support the War on Drugs); Omar Saleem, The Age of
Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry
"Stop and Frisk," 50 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 455 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court's limited
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment "has gained momentum from a societal fear of crime and
illegal drugs"); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The FourthAmendment on
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1337 (1990) ("The Court's current methodology and crabbed
view of the fourth amendment's protection for those on the street is the inevitable result of replacing
traditional fourth amendment principles without ad hoc balancing" as a consequence of the War on
Drugs.); Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 149, at 582 (arguing the Supreme Court has
increased police power and discretion as a result of the War on Drugs).
168. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 686, n.52 (asserting that Whren and Wardlow have
contributed significantly to the Supreme Court's erosion of the Fourth Amendment).
169.

Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

170.

Id.at 813.

171. See Tracy Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 354-62
(1998); See also, Kenneth B. Nunn, Law, Culture, and the Morality of Judicial Choice, 28 CUMB. L.
REV. 581, 587 n.22 (1998) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Whren permits police departments to
stop pedestrians and motorists at will, and allows well-documented and widespread discriminatory
detentions of people of color to continue unchecked.").
172.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).

173.

Id. at 123.

174. Although the Court had ruled earlier in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983),
that citizens had the right to ignore the police and "go about [their] business," the Court in Wardlow
rejected any interpretation of flight that would allow a citizen to legitimately flee to avoid the police.
"[U]nprovoked flight," stated the Court, "is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its
very nature, is not 'going about one's business,' in fact, it is just the opposite." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
125.
175. According to the Supreme Court, "Headlong flight-whenever it occurs-is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly
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Ronner has remarked, this perspective takes "an apartheid approach to the
Fourth Amendment and actively condones police harassment of minorities." 176
d. No-Knock Warrants, SWAT Teams and Military-Style Police Tactics
The War on Drugs has led to the militarization of police departments across
the nation. 177 More specifically, it has led to the increased deployment of
military-style tactics for crime control in African American communities, with a
correspondently greater potential for death and destruction of property.178 As
these new tactics have become commonplace, the role of police has changed,
altering the character of many police
departments from law enforcement
17 9
agencies to military occupation forces.
The militarization of local police forces can be traced to the proliferation of
paramilitary police units, often referred to as Special Weapons and Tactics
180
(SWAT) teams. Los Angeles established the first SWAT team in the 1960s.
Originally, paramilitary police units were intended for use in special
circumstances, such as hostage situations and terrorist attacks. 18 1 In the 1960s
in
and 70s, there were few SWAT units; those that existed were typically found 182
large metropolitan areas. However, the policies and practices of the drug war

suggestive of such." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. The Court's holding in Wardlow was presaged by
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (holding that a suspect fleeing from a police officer
was not "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes). While the Court in Hodari did not decide the
question whether flight would give rise to reasonable suspicion for a stop, Scalia's opinion for the
Court strongly suggested that it would answer such a question in the affirmative. Justice Scalia cited
Proverbs 21:8 ("The wicked flee when no man pursueth") to emphasize his point. Hodari D., 499
U.S. at 624, n.1.
1'76. Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 383, 409 (2001).
177. See generally Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, MilitarizingAmerican Police: The
Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 Soc. PROBLEMS 1 (1997); William Booth,
Exploding Number of S. W.A. T.Teams Set OffAlarms, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at Al.
178. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 177, at 8, 12 (claiming "numerous incidents and
common sense raise questions about the dangerousness of these units to officers and citizens").
179. See id. at 12 (noting "the normalization of paramilitary units into mainstream police
work, and a close ideological and material connection between [SWAT teams] and the U.S. armed
forces") and at 2 (observing that a "close ideological and operational alliance between [the military
and the police] in handling domestic social problems usually is associated with repressive
govemments").
180.

See

DIANE CECILIA WEBER, CATO

INSTITUTE,

WARRIOR

COPS: THE OMINOUS

6, Briefing Paper No. 50
(1999) (stating that Los Angeles formed the first SWAT team shortly after a mass killing by a sniper
in a University of Texas tower in 1966). The official web site of the Los Angeles Police Department
states that its SWAT team was founded in 1967. See the Official Website of the Los Angeles Police
Department, at http://www.lapdonline.org/index.htm.
GROWTH OF PARAMILITARISM IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS

181. WEBER, supra note 180, at 7. According to Weber, "[T]he modem SWAT team was
bom of public fear and the perception by police that crime had reached such proportions.., that
more armament and more training were needed." Id. at 6.
182.

These policies and practices include an inherent "militarism," defined by Kraska and
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encouraged the use of SWAT teams to expand rapidly into small and medium
sized cities throughout the country. As a consequence, "most SWAT teams
have been created in the 1980s and 1990s. ' 183 A study by Peter Kraska and
Victor Kappeler showed that by 1997, in cities with populations over 50,000,
SWAT teams were operated by nearly ninety percent of police departments
surveyed. 184 Surprisingly, the survey also disclosed that seventy percent185of the
police departments in cities under 50,000 had paramilitary units, as well.
SWAT units have provided a conduit for the transfer of military techniques
and materials into the hands of ordinary police departments. As a result of a
1994 Memorandum of Understanding between the Justice Department and the
Department of Defense, 186 civilian police departments have access to "an array
187
of high-tech military items previously reserved for use during wartime."
Between 1995 and 1997, the U.S. military donated 1.2 million pieces of military
hardware to domestic police departments, including 73 grenade launchers and
112 armored personnel carriers. 188 Other sophisticated equipment provided to
police departments includes the following: "automatic weapons with laser sights
and sound suppressors, surveillance equipment such as Laser Bugs that can
detect sounds within a building by bouncing a laser beam off a window, pinhole
cameras, flash and noise grenades, rubber bullets, bullet-proof apparel, battering
189
rams, and more."
Although originally intended for extreme and dangerous situations that
were beyond the response capability of regular police patrols, the ubiquity of
SWAT teams means that police departments often use their paramilitary units
for routine law enforcement activities. 190 The main use of a SWAT team 19in1
war.
departments throughout the country appears to be to support the drug
According to Kraska and Kappeler, the respondents to their survey "reported
that the majority of call-outs were to conduct what the police call 'high risk
Kappeler as "a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate
means to solve problems and gain political power." Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 177, at 1.
supranote 180, at 8.

183.

WEBER,

184.

Kraska and Kappeler, supra note 177, at 5-6.

185. Id. Weber notes that small towns "like Jasper, Lakeland and Palm Beach, Florida;
Lakewood, New Jersey; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Charlottesville, Virginia; and Harwich,
Massachusetts, have SWAT teams." WEBER, supranote 180, at 8. In addition, the campus police at
the University of Central Florida even operate a SWAT unit. Id.

186.

See U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: SECOND ANNIVERSARY

8-18 (Feb. 1997) (discussing Memorandum of Understanding Between Department of
Defense and Department of Justice on Operations Other than War and Law Enforcement).
REPORT,

187.

WEBER, supra note 180, at 5.

188.

Id. at l.

189. Id. at 7. See also Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 177, at 3 (describing machine guns,
grenades, and other lethal and non-lethal equipment SWAT teams are likely to possess).
190.

WEBER, supranote 180, at 8.

191.

Kraska &Kappeler, supra note 177, at 7.
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warrant work,' mostly 'drug raids.' 192 Less than twenty percent of paramilitary
police unit calls were for situations understood as typically amenable to SWAT
team intervention. 193 Particularly in so-called "high crime areas," police
departments are likely to use SWAT teams as proactive units to seek out
criminal activity, as opposed to using them solely to respond to a crisis situation.
Kraska and Kappeler found 107 departments that used paramilitary police units
as a proactive patrol in high crime areas. 194 According to some of the SWAT
team commanders that Kraska and Kappeler interviewed, "[T]his type of
proactive policing-instigated not by an existing high risk situation but one
generated by the police themselves-is highly dangerous for both PPU [police
paramilitary unit] members and citizens." 1 5
Warrant work conducted by SWAT teams "consists almost exclusively of
what police call 'no-knock entries."' 196 The potential danger of allowing police
officers to enter homes and businesses without announcing their identity and
purpose has been well-known since colonial times. 197 Officers may startle
residents who may seek to defend their homes. 198 Officers may inadvertently
harm residents or innocent bystanders by the use of force necessary to effect the
sudden entry of targeted buildings. 19 9 Breaking into buildings through surprise
and stealth seems like a tactic better suited to an occupying army, then to
civilian peace officers. However, the drug war has worn down the traditional
resistance to the no-knock warrant. 2 0 Since the onset of the drug war, courts

192.

Id

193. Of the total number of call-outs, civil disturbances accounted for 1.3%, terrorist
incidents .09%, hostage situations 6.6%, barricaded persons 13.4%, and warrant work 75.9 %. Id.
194. Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 177, at 9. The response of 107 departments was 20%
of total departments responding. Id.

195.

Id.
at 8.

196.

id. at 7.

197. See Mark Josephson, Fourth Amendment-Must Police Knock and Announce
Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House? 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 1235-37
(1996) (discussing how the common law requirement that police knock and announce prior to a
search of a home was transplanted to the colonies following the 1603 English holding in Semayne's
Case). Under current law, police officers are not required to knock and announce in every case.
Rather, following Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 929 (1995), whether officers do knock and announce
is a factor in determining whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See
Josephson, supra at 1229, 1250.

198.

Josephson, supranote 197, at 1234.

199.

Id.

200. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,
many jurisdictions permitted courts to issue no-knock warrants based merely on broad
generalizations about the dangerousness of drug dealers and the presumed ease with which drugs
could be destroyed. See Adina Schwartz, Homes as Folding Umbrellas. Two Recent Supreme Court
Decisions on "Knock and Announce," 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545, 555-56 (1998) (discussing the
"blanket approach" that prevailed in many jurisdictions prior to Richards). Richards held that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit courts to create a per se exemption from the knock and
announce rule for drug cases and that the reasonableness of a departure from the knock and
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1

20
to the police.
have been willing to legalize no-knock warrants and issue them
subject to this potentially
Thus, African American communities are20 now
2
technique.
police
dangerous and intimidating
The extension of paramilitary police units into everyday policing not only
escalates the degree of force and violence that may be interposed between
citizens and the state, it also escalates the likelihood that more forceful methods
will actually be used. 20 3 In the context of a war on drugs, the identification of
drug users and dealers as an enemy upon whom force may be used, is not
surprising. The very use of the metaphor of "war," as a conceptual matter,
implies the use of force. As Kraska and Kappeler state:

[I]t takes little acumen to recognize how the metaphor of "war"-with
its emphasis on occupation, suppression through force, and restoration
of territory-coincides naturally with the "new science" of the police
targeting and taking control, indeed ownership, of politically defined
spaces,

social

aggregate

populations,

and

social

problems with

military-style teams and tactics. 204
Thus, the growing collaboration between the police and the military can be
expected to have ideological consequences, as well as technological ones. As
police paramilitary units train with military organizations, they may be

'20 5
While training
encouraged to develop what amounts to a "warrior mentality."
"may seem to be a purely technical exercise, it actually plays a central role in

paramilitary

subculture,"

as

several

scholars

of police

behavior

have

announce rule must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Richards, 520 U.S. at 388. Yet, as
Professor Schwartz points out, Richards does not sound a retreat from the use of no-knock warrants
in drug cases. See Schwartz, supra, at 561-62. Richards' constitutionally imposed standards for the
issuance of no-knock warrants are minimal. Police may enter a residence without knocking and
announcing if they entertain a "reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence
•..would be dangerous or futile," or that it would allow the destruction of evidence or otherwise
"inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. The Richards court
stated explicitly that "[tihis showing is not high" and that "felony drug investigations may frequently
present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry." Id.
201. See Richard E. Burket, The State Law Enforcement Apparatus as America: Authority,
Arbitrariness,and the "Force of Law" in Vineland, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 727, 749 (1999)
(describing numerous incidents where innocent people were brutalized by police executing no-knock
warrants as a consequence of the War on Drugs); Michael Cooper, Raids, and Complaints, Rise as
City Draws on Drug Tips, NY TIMES, May 26, 1998, at Al (reporting that warrants for drug
searches in NYC more than doubled from 1994 to 1997, and that the that the majority of these were
no-knock warrants).
202. Cooper, supra note 201 (reporting complaints of civil libertarians that "the questionable
raids have all been in the homes of black and Hispanic families").
203. According to Kraska & Kappeler, the militarization of local police departments through
the proliferation of SWAT teams has encouraged "the cynical view that the most expedient route to
solving social problems is through military-style force, weaponry, and technology." Kraska &
Kappeler, supranote 177, at 12.

204.

Id. at 1.

205. WEBER, supra note 180, at 10 (describing "mindset of the warrior" as a state of mind
which requires a soldier to "use lethal force on the enemy,.., follow orders unthinkingly, act[ ] in
concert with his comrades, and initiate[ ] violence on command").
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observed. 2 06 The inoculation of a "warrior mentality" in police officers,
however, is inappropriate because police and military have different social
functions:
The job of a police officer is to keep the peace, but not by just any
means. Police officers are expected to apprehend suspected lawbreakers while adhering to constitutional procedures.
They are
expected to use minimum force and to deliver suspects to a court of
law. The soldier on the other hand, is an instrument of war. In boot
camp, recruits are trained to inflict maximum damage on enemy
personnel. Confusing the police function with the military function
can have dangerous consequences. As Albuquerque police chief Jerry
Glavin has noted, "If [cops] have a mind-set that the goal is to take out
20 7
a citizen, it will happen."
The danger that SWAT teams pose to inner-city communities has been
exposed by several incidents in which citizens have been unnecessarily harmed
as a result of paramilitary police activity. 208 In Dinuba, California, a man was
wrongly killed when a SWAT team stormed his house looking for one of the
man's sons. 209 The man was shot fifteen times before he or his wife could
determine who was breaking into their house and why. 2 1 Albuquerque, New
2 11
Mexico has experienced several controversial SWAT team killings.
Professor Samuel Walker of the University of Nebraska was hired by the City of
Albuquerque to evaluate police department policies and procedures. "According
to Walker, 'The rate of killings by the police was just off the charts ....

They

had an organizational culture that led them to escalate situations upward rather
than de-escalating.'. . . [T]he mindset of the warrior is simply not appropriate
2 12
for the civilian officer charged with enforcing the law."
As a consequence of the War on Drugs, the use of military-style weapons
213
and tactics by police departments throughout the nation has become routine.
Police departments are locked in a race to see who can arm themselves with the
most powerful weaponry available for civilian use. 2 14 Yet, the easy manner in
206.

Kraska &Kappeler, supra note 177, at 11.

207.

WEBER, supra note 180, at 2-3.

208. Kraska and Kappeler found it anomalous that seven of the departments they studied
registered "sharp drops" in SWAT team activity. According to the researchers, "[w]e called these
departments out of curiosity and they explained that there had been a controversy over the PPU
killing or wounding innocent people, sometimes while at the wrong residence, or instances where
team members were shot by 'friendly fire."' Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 177, at 12 n. 11.

209.

WEBER, supranote 180, at 10-11.

210.

Id.

211.

Id.

212.

Id.

213.

Id. at 7-8.

214.

Id.
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which military technology can be obtained, and the militaristic attitudes that
police officers using this technology also acquire, pose potential dangers to
citizens who are unfortunate enough to encounter paramilitary police units,
especially those 15
African Americans who live in the areas where these units
2
regularly patrol.
3. Tonry's Thesis: Did Drug Policy Makers Intentionally Target the Black
Community?
In 1995, Michael Tonry, a criminologist and law professor at the University
of Minnesota, wrote a book published by the Oxford University Press entitled
"Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in America. '2 16 In his book,
Tonry proffered a thesis, which generated a significant amount of
controversy. 2 17 Tonry charged that the racial disparities in the criminal justice
system were not merely happenstance, but the result of a "calculated effort
foreordained to increase [the] percentages [of Blacks in prison]." 218 According
to Tonry, the planners of the drug war knew that the War on Drugs was
unnecessary, and that the policies they selected to fight the War on Drugs would
not work. 2 19 More critically, Tonry charged that the drug war's planners were
aware that the ineffective policies they proposed to implement would adversely
220
affect African American males.
The War on Drugs was unnecessary, according to Tonry, because drug use
was already declining in the United States, and had been doing so for several
years. 22 1 If less and less Americans were using drugs, then a costly war to
215. Kraska and Kappeler claim that "most PPUs proactively seek out and even manufacture
highly dangerous situations." Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 177, at 12.
216.

TONRY, supranote 44.

217. See, e.g., Davis, Benign Neglect, supra note 111, at 1670-71 (critiquing Tonry's claim
that the overrepresentation of Black men in the criminal justice system is not primarily caused by
racial bias and questioning Tonry's conclusion that the architects of the drug war were aware it
would disproportionately affect Blacks and should be held morally culpable for the damage the drug
war inflicted on Black communities).
218.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 82.

219. See id. at 83 (arguing that the goal of reducing drug abuse "had been achieved before
the drug war began" and that no convincing case could be made for "more emphasis on law
enforcement directed at users, user-dealers, and street level trafficking").
220.

According to Tonry:

Given what we know about past periods of intolerance of drug use and their tendencies to scapegoat
minority groups, and that disadvantaged urban blacks are the archetypal users of crack cocaine-and
therefore are the principal possessors, sellers, and low-level distributors-anyone who knew the
history of American drug policy could have foreseen that this war on drugs would target and mostly
engage young disadvantage members of minority groups as the enemy.
Id. at 94. For an argument that there is scant evidence to support the widespread belief that African
Americans are the "principal possessors, sellers, and low-level distributors" of crack cocaine, see
supra notes 10 1-111 and accompanying text.
221.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 83 (claiming that at the time of Reagan's declaration of the
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reduce drug usage would not seem to make sense. 222 More importantly, Tonry
charged, even if the drug war was necessary to address a burgeoning problem
with illegal drugs in the United States, the policies the drug warriors selected to
deal with that problem were not likely to work. 2 2 3 Tonry argues that changes in

drug usage are best effected through a combination of supply reduction and
demand reduction strategies. 224 The anti-drug policies of the Reagan and Bush
administrations were skewed too far in favor of supply reduction approaches to
be effective. 2 2 5 The drug policy strategists who planned the drug war, Tonry
226
asserts, knew this.

Tonry's most explosive charges addressed the racial imbalance in drug war
motivated arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. 22 7 According to Tonry, "The
War on Drugs foreseeably and unnecessarily blighted the lives of hundreds of
thousands of young disadvantaged [B]lack Americans." 228 Tonry believes the
planners of the drug war knew their decision to increase penalties for drug
possession and sale would adversely and disproportionately affect African
Americans because while white middle-class drug use was declining, other data
showed that drug use among poor, urban African Americans and Hispanics
remained steady.229 In Tonry's words:
The white-shirted-and-suspendered officials of the Office of National
2 30
Drug Control Policy understood the arcane intricacies of NIDA
surveys, DUF,
and DAWN
better than anyone else in the United
War on Drugs in 1987, "it was clear that drug use was in decline and had been since the early
1980s").
222.

Id.

223. Id. at 116 (asserting that "by adapting a prohibitionistic crime control approach, rather
than a harm-reduction approach, policymakers chose strategies that had little prospect of succeeding
but a high likelihood of worsening racial disproportions in the criminal justice system").
224. Id. at 122 (arguing that both supply-side and demand-side strategies have a role to play
in drug use reduction efforts).
225. Id. at 119 (claiming that "American policy has tilted heavily toward prohibition" and
that the ratio of federal funding which allots 70% of resources to law enforcement programs and
only 30% to treatment and education, has resulted in "[t]oo many people in prison and too few
people in treatment").
226. Id at 116 (arguing that "policymakers chose strategies that had little prospect of
succeeding" and that "[tihere was no basis on which policymakers could have believed in good faith
that the key strategies of the War on Drugs would be so successful as to justify the burdens that they
would impose on minority citizens").
227. TONRY, supra note 44, at 104-5 (discussing the disparate impact of drug arrests and
prosecutions). According to Tonry, "Drug arrests are a principle reason that the proportions of
blacks in prison and more generally under criminal justice system control have risen rapidly in
recent years to ... extraordinary levels .... " Id. at 110.
228.

Id. at 82.

229.

Id. at 100-3.

230.

NIDA stands for The National Institute on Drug Abuse. See id. at 87.

231.

DUF stands for Drug Use Forecasting program of the Department of Justice. See id. at
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States. They knew that drug abuse was falling among the vast
majority of the population. They knew that drug use was not
declining among disadvantaged members of the urban underclass.
They knew that the War on Drugs would be fought mainly in the
minority areas of American cities and that those arrested and
imprisoned would disproportionately be young blacks and
23 3
Hispanics.
Thus, the adverse impact of the drug war could not be accidental. The
architects of the drug war had to know who would be most affected by their
policies. They had to understand what Daniel Patrick Moynihan pointed out in
1993 when he said "[B]y choosing prohibition [of drugs] we are choosing to
have an intense crime problem concentrated among minorities. '' 234 At best,
according to Tonry, the explosion in the Black prison population was "a
foreseen but not an intended consequence" of the War on Drugs. 235 At worst,
Tonry says, it was "the product of malign neglect"-a consequence that was
2 36
malicious and evil.
If the architects of the drug war knew their plans would have devastating
impact on the African American community, then they apparently did not care.
What could provide the motive for such an assault on African Americans?
According to Tonry, the motive was two-fold. 237 First, Tonry claims that to the
extent the Reagan and Bush administrations attempted to craft an actual drug
policy, they intended to use the criminalization of behaviors disproportionately
found in the African American and Hispanic community to shape and encourage
anti-drug values and beliefs in the white community. 238 Thus, the drug war was
"an exercise in moral education" 239 that inflicted great damage on young
African Americans and Hispanics "primarily for the benefit of the great mass of,
mostly white, non-disadvantaged Americans." 240 But Tonry suggests there is
another, more sinister, reason for the sacrifice of the young African American
victims of the drug war.24 1 According to Tonry, the drug war was "launched to
97.
232.

DAWN stands for Drug Abuse Warning Network. See id.

233.

TONRY, supranote 44, at 104.

234.

Id.

235.

Id. at 115.

236. Id. Tonry makes the point that using standard criminal law doctrine, the architects of
the drug war ought to be held culpably for the consequences of their actions. That is, to undertake
an act with the knowledge that a given result will occur, is substantially the same as to undertake the
act with the purpose that the result occur. See id. at 32-33.
237.

See id. at 95-123.

238.

TONRY, supra note 44, at 96-97.

239.

Id. at 97.

240.

Id. at 95.

241.

Id. at 123.
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achieve political, not policy objectives. '242 Reagan's advisors wanted to reap
the political benefits of appearing tough on drugs at a time when drug use had
fallen into disfavor with the American public. The drug war, then, was a cynical
way to "use... disadvantaged [B]lack Americans as a means to the achievement
2 3
of politician's electoral ends." 4

B. The Historic Connection of Drugs and Race

The exploitation of drugs and race for political ends is nothing new.244 It is
as old as American-style politics. 2 45 Consequently, there has always been a
racial dimension to American drug policy. 24 6 Drugs have always been
associated with foreign or alien cultural groups and constructed as part of the
threat posed by those groups. 2 4 7 The drug war fits well into old patterns and is

merely the latest version of a time-honored tradition. 248 Over the years, drug
hysteria has come and gone. 2 4 9

242.

Id.

243.

Id.

Interestingly, each period develops its own

244. See JOHNS, supra note 7, at 74 (claiming that "[t]he focus of drug panics on minority
populations is...
nothing new."); Arthur L. Burney, Cocaine Prohibition:Drug-InducedMadness in
the Western Hemisphere, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 19, 49-50 (1995) (stating "political interest in
maintaining the connection between drugs and race has been a central theme of drug prohibition
from the outset"). For an excellent treatment of the history of drug prohibition in the United States
and the complex political and social issues that were involved in that history, see generally DAVID F.
MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL (3d ed. 1999).
245. See JOHNS, supranote 7, at 74 (tracing a negative connotation of opium to the Chinese
to as early as the late 1800's); see id. at 294 (describing the American concern with narcotics as a
political problem "in the fullest sense").
246. See David H. Angeli, A "Second Look" at Crack Cocaine Sentencing Policies: One
More Try for FederalEqual Protection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1211, 1222 (1997) ("Historically,
drugs have been regulated when they were perceived to threaten essential social restrictions that kept
minority groups under the control of the white majority.").
247.

See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 294 -95. According to Musto:

Certain drugs were dreaded because they seemed to undermine essential social
restrictions which kept [disempowered] groups under control: cocaine was supposed to
enable blacks to withstand bullets which would kill normal persons and to stimulate
sexual assault. Fear that smoking opium facilitated sexual contact between Chinese
and white Americans was also a factoring its total prohibition. Chicanos in the
Southwest were believed to be incited to violence by smoking marijuana ...Alcohol
was associated with immigrants crowding into large and corrupt cities. In each
instance, use of a particular drug was attributed to an identifiable and threatening
minority group.
Id.
248. See id. at 299 (asserting that "[a]s new generations confront the narcotics question, the
same fundamental issues reappear").
249. John Helmer argues that "[p]ublic concern about narcotics use and drug addiction is a
repeating thing." JOHN HELMER, DRUGS AND MINORITY OPPRESSION 8 (1975). Helmer argues
these periods of concern recur every twenty to thirty years and consist of three identifiable stages.
Id. at 8-9. Stage one begins with the discovery of a new "drug problem." Id. at 8. Stage two
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racist myths. 2 50 These myths deserve close examination because they disclose
the nature of the fears of the dominant culture and illuminate the need to
construct reality to eliminate those fears. Below, I briefly review some of the
more prominent myths. Next, I discuss some of the social purposes these myths
served.
1. Drugs, Myths, and Race

a. Chinese and Opium

The first national campaign against narcotics was designed to suppress
opium, a drug that was identified with Chinese immigrants. 25 1 Opium use in the
United States was virtually unnoticed until efforts were made to curb Chinese
immigration in the mid- 1870s. 252 Then, opium became a dangerous drug and its
suppression a reason to exclude the Chinese. 2 53 The Chinese were disliked as
economic competitors of the white laboring classes and small-scale merchants
and farmers. 254 Chinese immigrants were blamed for the low wages and
depressed economic conditions of the time. 255 Although the Chinese were
ostracized because of the belief that they were "opium eaters," Chinese
immigrants were also victims of a racist society that was not prepared to
assimilate people who were different. 256 According to John Helmer, "The
ideological role of the anti-opium campaign was to get rid of the Chinese. It had
a practical consequence-providing a legal basis for the unrestrained and
arbitrary police raids and searches of Chinese premises in San Francisco."257 At
the turn of the century, it was estimated that approximately thirty-five percent of
the Chinese American population used opium.258 Most users were immigrants

involves determining causes of the problem and selecting potential cures. Id. Finally, stage three is
reached as the application of the identified solutions to the problem become routine. Id. at 9.
250. See id. at 18-79 (discussing negative stereotypes involving drug use associated with the
Chinese, Blacks, and Mexicans); MUSTO, supra note 244; RICHEY MANN, supra note 100, at 58-67
(discussing drug myths associated with Chinese Americans, Mexican Americans, African Americans
and Native Americans).
251.

HELMER, supra note 249, at 58 n. 241.

252.

Id.

253. See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 3 (asserting that opium prohibition resulted from the
drug's association with the Chinese).
254.

RICHEY MANN, supranote 100, at 59.

255.

Id.

256.

Id.

257.

HELMER, supranote 249, at 32.

258.

RICHEY MANN, supranote 100, at 58.
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from the Chinese mainland 2 59 where opium use was widespread, chiefly due to
the efforts of the British and other western powers that imposed the drug on
China as a result of the Opium Wars. 2 6 While in European eyes the use of
opium among the Chinese could be exploited for economic gain, opium use in
the United States was not permitted. 26 1 Other than the fact that it provided a
convenient excuse to harass the Chinese, opium use was disliked because of the
perceived threat it posed to the safety and purity of white women. 262 It was
white women
widely believe that Chinese opium dens would entrap virtuous
263
who would then be available to have sex with Asian men.

259.

See id at 60.

260. See Alfred W. McCoy, From Free Trade to Prohibition: A Critical History of the
Modern Asian Opium Trade, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 307, 317-18, 320 (2000) (discussing how
Britain defied Chinese drug laws and fought two wars to eventually force China to legalize opium
and import sufficient opium for the drug to become "a major global commodity, produced and traded
on the scale of stimulants such as coffee and tea"); R.I.R. Abeyratne, International Initiatives at
Controlling the Illicit Transportation of Narcotic Drugs by Air, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 289, 291-93
(1997) (depicting Chinese attempts to ban opium as cause of Opium Wars with Britain). The
Chinese made attempts to prohibit the importation of opium as early as 1729, but this attempt "was
to little avail, as opium was being smuggled at that time into China through India by the Portuguese
and later by the English." Id. at 291. Following Chinese seizure of foreign stocks of opium in 1840,
the British initiated the First Opium War against China. Id. at 292. As a result of the British victory
in the First Opium War, China ceded Hong Kong to England, which the British then used to extend
the opium trade even further. Id. The British and French fought the Second Opium War from 1856
to 1858 to force the Chinese to legalize the opium trade and stymie Chinese attempts at prohibition.
Id. Queen Victoria was apparently unmoved by a letter from Chinese officials, which, appealing to
her sense of reason stated: "Suppose there were people from another country who carried opium for
sale to England and seduced your people into buying and smoking it; certainly your honorable rule
would deeply hate it and be bitterly aroused." WILLIAM ALFORD, COMPARATIVE LAWS: CHINA 27880 (1990), quoted in Di Jiang-Schuerger, The Most FavoredNation Trade Status and China: The
Debate Should Stop Here, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1321, 1349 (1998).
261.
1909).

MUSTO, supra note 244, at 3-4 (noting that efforts to prohibit opium began as early as

262. See Constance Backhouse, The White Women's Labor Laws: Anti-Chinese Racism in
Early Twentieth-Century Canada, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 315, 338 n.80,(1996) ("Opium ...was
thought to be capable of fueling 'flagging sexual energies,' transforming the asexual Chinese man
into a sexually dangerous adversary.").
263. Respectable whites believed the drug encouraged white women to lose sexual
inhibition and to engage in acts of immorality. See Kathleen Auerhahn, The Split Labor Market and
the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United States, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 411, 420 n. 4
(1999) (noting white fears that "the seductiveness and aphrodisiac qualities of the drug itself would
lure white women into relations with Chinese"). Indeed, Hamilton Wright, the campaigner most
responsible for the passage of the Harrison Act, stated that "one of the most unfortunate phases of
the habit of smoking opium in this country [is] the large number of women who have become
involved and were living as common-law wives or cohabiting with Chinese in the Chinatowns of our
cities." MUSTO, supra note 244, at 43. Another 19th century writer opined that "[m]any females are
so much excited sexually by the smoking of opium during the first few weeks that old smokers with
the sole object of ruining them have taught them to smoke. Many innocent and over-curious girls
have thus been seduced." H.H. KANE, OPIUM SMOKING 1N AMERICA AND CHINA 8 (1882), quoted in
HELMER, supra note 249, at 10'. The hysterical character of these fears for white female purity
becomes evident when one considers that, "in fact, the use of opiates reduces erotic interest and
drive." HELMER, supraat 11.
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b. Blacks and Cocaine
The identification of African Americans with cocaine predates the recent
panic over crack cocaine and the current War on Drugs. 264 African Americans
were associated with cocaine use as early as the 1890s. 265 At that time, cocaine
was widely available in the United States, particularly in the South, in the form
of patent medicines and soft drinks. 266 While cocaine use was then acceptable
for whites, it was considered dangerous to allow African Americans access to
the drug. 267 Around the turn of the century, as racism against African
Americans solidified, whites viewed African Americans as threatening in new
ways. 268 White society viewed Africans as docile and childlike during slavery,
but following the Reconstruction, whites came to view Blacks as a threat to
white property, interests, and lives. 269 African Americans were thought to 2be
70
untrustworthy scoundrels, who if left uncontrolled, would rob and steal.
From the Reconstruction on, propaganda in the North and South portraying the
vulnerability of white families, particularly white women, to Black scoundrels
27 1
was common.

It was thought Blacks used cocaine to fortify themselves for criminal
activities. 272 Whites believed cocaine would make Blacks bolder, more
aggressive, and oblivious to pain. 273 Rumors stated that Blacks under the
influence of cocaine were more inclined toward crime and harder to catch. Most
importantly, "[slouthern whites believed that cocaine use by [B]lacks would
cause them to 'forget their place' and lead to violence against whites, particularly

264. See JOHNS, supra note 7, at 74 (noting similarities between rhetoric regarding cocaine
use by Blacks during previous anti-drug campaigns and the current War on Drugs).
265. See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 304 n.15 (reporting cocaine's association with the
southern Negro had become a clich6 "a decade or more before the Harrison Act").

266.

RICHEY MANN, supranote 100, at 60.

267. See HELMER, supra note 249, at 47 (reporting 1908 comments by Washington, D.C.
police chief that cocaine "transforms otherwise safe and tractable citizens into dangerous
characters"). Musto writes: "Cocaine was especially feared in the South by 1900 because of its
euphoric and stimulating properties. The South feared that Negro cocaine users might become
oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack white society." MUSTO, supra note 244, at 6.
268.

See generally GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:

THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817 -1914 (1971) (describing white

attitudes toward African people in the formative years of American culture).
269. Id. at 111. See also, Delgado, supra note 21, at 1264 (describing a new, postreconstruction stereotype of African American men as "brutish and bestial").
270.

See FREDERICKSON, supranote 268, at I11.

271.

Id.

272. See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 65 (reporting that "[c]ocaine raised the specter of the
wild Negro" who was predisposed through use of the drug "toward insanity and crime").

273. See id.
at 7 (relating that "[a]necdotes often told of superhuman strength, cunning, and
efficiency resulting from cocaine").
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the dreaded rape of white women. ' 274 The belief that cocaine made African
Americans impervious to pain led police departments all across the South to
275
switch from .32 caliber revolvers to the more lethal .38 caliber revolvers.
Consequently, state and local governments, and later the federal
government, sought to suppress the availability

of cocaine. 27 6

Federal

regulation of food and drugs removed cocaine from foodstuffs and over-thecounter medications. 2 7 7
Later, the Harrison
278
criminalization statute, made cocaine illegal.

Act, the nation's

first drug

c. Chicanosand Marijuana

Chicanos, or Mexican Americans, resided in the Southwest before it
became part of the United States and before Anglo-Americans arrived in that
part of the country. 279 When the southwestern region became part of the United
States through conquest and colonization, the Chicanos were reduced to a
second class status. 2 8 Viewed as a race apart, whites stereotyped Chicanos as
lazy, crime-ridden, and violent. 281 In the 1920s, efforts were first made to
suppress the use of marijuana, which was used as a drug within the Chicano
community. 282 Several western states passed laws banning marijuana at that

274. RICHEY MANN, supra note 100, at 60. Musto quotes from several early 20' h century
sources who expressed fear that Black cocaine use would lead to the sexual assault of white women.
In a report to Congress, Dr. Hamilton Wright asserted "[I]t has been authoritatively stated that
cocaine is often the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the Negroes of the South and other
sections of the country." MUSTO, supra note 244, at 43-44. Dr. Christopher Koch, a member of the
Pennsylvania State Pharmacy Board, claimed that "[m]ost of the attacks upon white women of the
South are the direct result of a cocaine-crazed Negro brain." Id.
275.

MUSTO, supranote 244, at 7.

276. See WITSOTSKY, supranote 1, at 10 (reporting Oregon was first of several states to ban
the sale of cocaine without a prescription).
277. See id.; MUSTO, supra note 244, at 10 (describing federal efforts to control cocaine
through the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act and revenue powers).
278. WITSOTSKY, supra note 1, at 10-11. The Harrison Act passed in 1914. See Pub. L. No.
63-233, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
279. Chicanos did not immigrate to the United States. Instead, "Chicanos came under
United States authority through territorial conquest. Mexico's defeat at the hands of U.S. invaders in
the war of 1846-1848 left an estimated 60,000 Mexican citizens north of the new border in New
Mexico alone." Luis Angel Toro, "A People Distinctfrom Others": Race and Identity in Federal
Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1219,
1245 (1995).
280. See Kevin R. Johnson, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans, and Lat Crit Theory:
Commonalities and Differences Between Latina/o Experiences, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 114
(2000) (claiming that for Chicanos and Chicanas "second class citizenship can be traced to the
conquest of the Southwest, once a part of the Republic of Mexico").
281. See CHICANOS AND FILM: ESSAYS ON CHICANO REPRESENTATION AND RESISTANCE 3
(Chon A. Noriega ed., 1992) ("Like similar unflattering stereotypes of other subordinate groups,
those of the Chicano depict him as dirty, violent, hypersexual, treacherous, and thieving").
282.

See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 219 (reviewing how concern over marijuana arose with
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time. 2 83 Like cocaine with African Americans, it was thought that marijuana
encouraged Chicanos to commit crimes and become more violent and
dangerous. 284 During that same period, a labor surplus in the West positioned
Chicanos as competitors to white laborers. 285 The marijuana laws were used to
reduce the economic threat of a Mexican labor surplus. 286 According to one
observer of the period, "Public concern about marijuana grew because
Americans wanted to drive the Mexicans back over the border, for reasons that
had nothing to do with the nature of the drug or its physiological effects." 2 87 In
1937, the federal government restricted access to marijuana through the
288
Marijuana Tax Act.
2. Drugs as a Threat to White Power
What explains the centrality of drugs to American law enforcement efforts?
Why is law enforcement the social institution of choice in dealing with the threat
or perceived threat of drugs? Why do racial groups other than Europeans figure
so prominently in the history of drug use and prohibition in this country? These
patterns are replicated as they are because drug use by non-white populations is
perceived as a threat to white power. 289 As I explain below, drug use threatens
white control over non-white populations 290 and drug use creates economic
29 1
activity that is outside of the control of white elites.
a. Drugs as a Threat to White Social Control
The use of drugs threatens white control of non-European communities and
individuals. It threatens the present social and political order in three ways.
First, social control is ultimately maintained by coercion. 292
African
Mexican immigration in 1920s).
283. See HELMER, supranote 249, at 54, 165 n.3 (discussing early anti-marijuana legislation
in Washington, California, Texas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Kansas).
284. See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 219 (reporting that "[b]y the mid-twenties horrible
crimes were attributed to marihuana and its Mexican purveyors").
285. See HELMER, supra note 249, at 73 (discussing excess labor as result of Great
Depression).
286. See id. at 74 ("Jail on drug or other charges, or repatriation by force or choice-these
were the methods adopted for reducing the Mexican labor surplus in the city where surplus ... was
the fundamental economic threat.").

287.

Id.at 56.

288.

Pub. L. No. 238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937). See HELMER, supra note 249, at 54.

289.

See MUSTO, supra note 244.

290.

See infra notes 292-364 and accompanying text.

291.

See infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.

292. See RAYMOND J. MICHALOWSKI, ORDER, LAW, AND CRIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINOLOGY 29 (1985) (arguing that "political power rests ultimately on force" and that "it is the
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Americans, and other people of color who know they are oppressed, submit to
the oppression predominantly because of their fear of the consequences should
they not.293 Drug intoxication may prevent people of color from recognizing
the extent of the threat posed by white institutions of social control, thereby
undermining the coercive power of the white power structure. 294 Secondly,
people of color who use drugs are by this very act rebelling against the authority
of the white power structure. 295 Their disobedience may cause them to lose
respect for white authority or may cause others to lose respect for white
authority. 29 6 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, drug use may tie users to
cultural institutions and cultural practices that are not dominated by whites and
are competitive to white institutions. 297 Different cultures have different ways
of relating to mind altering substances. 29 8 One culture may use a substance for
recreational purposes, while another culture may use the drug for religious
existence and reliance upon centralized force in the form of political power that distinguishes state
law from other forms of social control").
293. See Kimberle' Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1357 (1988) (arguing
coercion rather than consent explains Black obedience to authority).
294. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why Southern whites sought to regulate cocaine.
They were concerned that the drugs "euphoric and stimulating" qualities would cause African
American cocaine users to "become oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack white society."
MUSTO, supra note 244, at 6.
295. Jock Young, a prominent scholar of critical criminology in Britain, remarked on the
relationship between drug use and the conscious rejection of societal norms. According to Young,
"drug-taking in itself [may be] of greater value [to a marginalized group] as a symbol of their
difference and of their defiance of perceived social injustices." JOCK YOUNG, THE DRUGTAKERS:
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF DRUG USE 46 (1971). John Schuler and Arthur McBride similarly state:
"If we are committed to thinking about drug prohibition through the metaphor of the 'war on drugs,'
we should bear in mind that it is a civil war. It is one group of citizens, probably a numerical
minority, defying the dominant group's command not to purchase or use certain substances." John
T. Schuler & Arthur McBride, Notes From the Front: A Dissident Law-Enforcement Perspective on
DrugProhibition,18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 940-41 (1990).
296. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1774 (1992) (discussing how identification with
lawbreakers in the Black community may be an act of defiance).
297. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 16, at 79 (noting that every culture sanctions some
form of recreational drug use along with appropriate social controls).
298.

Id. A publication by the British Medical Association explains that:

[A]lmost every psychoactive drug known to humanity, from alcohol to opium, has
been regarded by some government and society as a dire threat to public order and
moral standards, and by another government and another society as a source of
harmless pleasure. Further, nations and governments sometimes change their views
completely. Almost every society has at least one drug whose use is tolerated, while
drugs used in other cultures are generally viewed quite differently and with deep
suspicion. Mexican Indians may have disapproved of alcohol, but they used
mescaline. Most Muslim cultures forbid alcohol, but they tolerate cannabis and opium.
BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, LIVING WITH RISK: THE BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION GUIDE
58 (1987), quoted in Norbert Gilmore, Drug Use and Human Rights: Privacy, Vulnerability,
Disability, and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 355, 357-58
(1996).
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purposes. In either case, the social practice of "drug use" requires the
establishment of a network of social institutions that "support" the use (or abuse)
of the substance in question. 299 For example, in the United States, the cultural
interpretation of cocaine use has required the establishment of social institutions
of ostracization, punishment and purification (e.g. jails, prisons, drug abuse
treatment programs, etc). 30 But this constellation of social institutions is
culturally specific. 30 1 That is, cocaine use does not necessarily have to result in
the same set of social institutions. 302 This is most readily seen in cases such as
the use of peyote by Native Americans, 303 or ganja by Rastafarians, 304 but in
any case, the principle is the same. The suppression
of the drug is also the
305
suppression of a particular cultural point of view.
Every society uses natural and artificial substances to alter moods and
change psychology. 30 6 The substances used for such purposes in a given culture
are familiar. 30 7 Their effects are well known and understood. 30 8 Substances
used for such purposes by other cultures, on the other hand, are unknown, and
their use is viewed as strange and unnatural. 309 According to historian John F.
Richards:
Generally each society and culture has drugs of choice that have been

299. See Gilmore, supra note 298, at 382 (noting that "which users and which drugs are to
be controlled, as well as which means are to be employed to accomplish this control, vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending upon how drug usage has been perceived and conceptualized").
300. See id at 398 (explaining that "viewing drug use and drug users as immoral has
strongly influenced the evolution of prohibitionary approaches td drug use, particularly in the United
States").
301.

See id. at 382.

302.

Id.

303. See Michael J. Simpson, Accommodating Indian Religions: The Proposed 1993
Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 54 MONT. L. REV. 19, 37-41 (1993)
(describing the sacramental use of peyote by the Native American Church).
304. See Jim Stipanuk, The High Priesthood Room Under the E Pluribus Umbrella? 22
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 703, 714-15 (1990) (describing Rastafarianism and the religious use of ganja, or
marijuana).
305. See MUSTO, supra note 244, at 295 (arguing that drug prohibition has historically been
used to suppress ethnic groups and preserve the established order); id. at 298 (noting that drugs were
viewed as threats imposed on America by foreign nations, which were made accessible by "unAmerican" ethnic minorities). See also Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic
Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1986) (asserting that efforts to suppress the drug trade
can be viewed as efforts to suppress a particular political point of view).
306.

DUKE & GROSS, supra note 16, at 79 (1993).

307. Id. (asserting that prior to the time of Columbus, access to psychotropic drugs was
limited to a few familiar substances).
308.

Id.

309. Id. at 80 (arguing indigenous cultural controls "not easily adaptable to the unfamiliar
imported intoxicants"). See also Stipanuk, supra note 304, at 706 ("Societies encounter the fewest
problems with psychoactive substances when they are able to incorporate those drugs into the social
fabric and define appropriate circumstances for their safe and intelligent use").
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assimilated to its cultural practices. The pleasures of these familiar
drugs are known; their dangers minimized by taboos and social rituals
of consumption, and their damage contained [or] ignored. Similar
31 0
adaptations in other cultures are invisible, or, if seen, grotesque.
The use of unknown drugs produces fear precisely because 31they
are unknown,
1
and because what is perceived of as "other" is not controlled.
b. Drugs and the Alternative Economic Threat
Illegal drugs constitute an enormous economic engine. The White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that Americans spent over $64
billion on illegal drugs in 2000. 3 12 This would rank the drug trade as one of the
largest industries in the country. 3 13 Some estimate that illegal earnings from the
drug trade are as large as $100 billion a year. 314 Most of the people who benefit
from the drug trade-who collect the bulk of the profits, who earn interest on
secret bank deposits, who supply the guns, transportation services, and trappings
of the drug lifestyle-are not Black. 3 15 Yet, African Americans can earn
significant amounts of income from the drug trade, employing large numbers of
employees, and providing needed economic benefits to otherwise forgotten
communities.316
Drug trafficking in the African American community is the result of "a
317
complex web of economic need meeting economic opportunity.
Predominantly African American communities in inner cities throughout the
nation are entrapped in severe economic depression. 3 18 They lack jobs,

310. John F. Richards, Opium and the British Indian Empire, Kingsley Martin Lecture (May
23, 2001) available at http://www-history.aas.duke.edu/pdfs/Kingsley/ 20Martin%2OLecture
%206.pdf.
311.

See id; DUKE & GROSS, supra note 16, at 79-80.

312. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHAT AMERICA'S USERS SPEND ON
ILLEGAL DRUGS: 1988-2000, at 2 (2001) (reporting that Americans spent $64.8 billion on illegal
drugs, including $36 billion on cocaine, $10 billion on heroin, $5.4 billion on methamphetamine,
$11 billion on marijuana and $2.4 billion on other illegal substances).
313. See Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The ProhibitionApocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
483, 514 (1997) (quoting Labor Secretary Robert Reich as stating that the narcotics trade "is one of
America's major industries, right up there with consumer electronics, automobiles and steel").
314. See Jeff Gerth, Vast Flow of Cash Threatens Currency, Banks, and Economies, N.Y,
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1988, at A12.
315. See LUSANE, supra note 1, at 88 (listing professions and businesses that benefit from
drug trafficking).

316.

1d. at49.

317.

Id. at47.

318. See Dash T. Douglas, A House Divided. The Social and Economic Underdevelopment
of America's Inner Cities, 10 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 380 (1999) (arguing that "[tihe inner
cities have become 'America's poorhouses, and millions of African Americans... are today locked
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opportunities, and resources and there is little government assistance
Chronic unemployment is a serious problem in these
available. 3 19
neighborhoods. 32 In most urban areas, Black youth unemployment hovers at
fifty percent or higher. 32 1 These neighborhoods suffer from high crime rates as
well. 322 Large percentages of the young men in these communities are involved
in the criminal justice system. 323 When crack cocaine became readily available,
the social and economic despair in these communities made them a breeding
ground for drug dealing: "Poor Black communities became the ideal market for
crack. They provided a ready-made distribution network of existing or easily
created street gangs of unemployed youth who could retail crack and other
communities also had consumers who would purchase the...
drugs. These
324
product."
In many African American communities, drug dealers are the largest
employer. 325 Large numbers of young unskilled African Americans can only
find employment as workers in the drug trade. 326 At a time when African
Americans communities were literally abandoned by their government, the
limited and equivocal benefits of the drug trade provided the only glimmer of
economic hope. "In the era of Reagan budget cuts, large cash flow into these
communities was quite welcome. Due to income derived from drug trafficking,
people can buy food, pay rent, and live materially better lives. Black youth can
simply by watching for the police and steering
easily make $100 a day or more 327
customers in the right direction."
Clarence Lusane describes the illegal drug industry as "the most equal

in them, with little hope of escape') (citations omitted).
319. See id. (discussing the lack of economic and social resources including employment
and educational opportunities).
at 382 ("Shifts in the American economy have resulted in an extraordinary rate
320. See id.
of African American inner-city joblessness, which has exacerbated other social problems in [urban]
areas").
321. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 16, at 169 (claiming "[s]ixty to [seventy] percent of
the youngsters in many inner-city communities are unemployed"). Writing in the mid-1980s,
sociologist William Julius Wilson found that 66% of all Black males ages 18 to 19 were unemployed
in 1955. By the mid-1980s, only 34% of all 18-19 year old Black males were unemployed. See
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND

PUBLIC POLICY 43 (1987).
322. See Douglas, supra note 318, at 380 (stating inner city "communities are predisposed to
public disorder, whereby crime and other aberrant behavior flourish").
323. See supra note 5 (discussing percentage of African American males in prison, on
probation, or on parole).
324.

LUSANE, supra note 1, at 49.

325. See id.at 49 (claiming "the illegal narcotics industry has become a major (perhaps the
major) employer of Black youth").
326.

Id.

327.

Id.
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opportunity employer in the world. ' 32 8 Anyone can participate in the drug
business. 329 All it takes is a willingness to expose oneself to the substantial
risks. 3 30 According to Rutgers University sociologist Jeffrey Fagan, "[c]rack
really is a deregulated market. It is totally open ... people have access to raw
materials ... and to selling locations." 33 1 No other area of the legitimate

economy offers this kind
of barrier free opportunity to would be African
332
American entrepreneurs.

The equal opportunity character of the drug trade makes it a threat to white
supremacy. The ability of African Americans to access money and power in the
drug trade creates an alternative economy in predominantly Black inner city
areas. 3 3 3 Through the drug trade, African Americans and other people of color
can earn money and develop channels of wealth and power that are not

controlled by whites. 334

In the same fashion, certain white individuals and

groups were able to gain a foothold in the American economy through illegal
activities. 3 3 5

The Kennedy's, for example, earned their family fortune running

alcohol during prohibition. 3 3 6

328.

Other wealthy Americans became rich pursing

Id. at 87.

329. Id. at 93 (reporting statement of Steve Rickman, of the Washington, D.C., Office of
Criminal Justice, that "anyone can set up shop" as a drug dealer). See also Nora V. Demleitner,
Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference Does Legalization Make? 15 WHITTIER L. REV.
613, 637 (1994) (claiming barriers to market entry low for some drugs like marijuana).
330. See Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkerson, Guns, Youth Violence and Social Identity in
Inner Cities, 24 CRIME & Jus. 105, 165-66 (1998) (describing robbery and violence as common
risks of street-level dealing).
331.

LUSANE, supra note 1, at 93.

332. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 16, at 169 (decrying the dearth of "meaningful
opportunities for inner-city youngsters" other than drug dealing). Prominent sociologist Joe Feagin
has argued that African American business people "are situated in a business world mostly not of
their own making, one with recurring racist hurdles they must overcome if they are to stay in
business." JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE
REPARATIONS 168 (2000) [hereinafter FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA]. Some of the racial barriers that
Feagin found African American business owners must face include fewer resources, higher costs,
lack of entree into business networks, lack of access to government contracts, and difficulties
obtaining business loans. FEAGIN, supra at 166-68.
333. See LUSANE, supra note 1, at 49 (arguing that "[d]ue to income derived from drug
trafficking, people can buy food, pay rent, and live materially better lives.").
334.

See id

335. See Sara Jankiewicz, Glasnost and the Growth of Global Organized Crime, 18 HOUS.
J. INT'L L. 215, 220-21 (1995) (arguing new Italian "immigrants made millions of dollars
bootlegging liquor during Prohibition, and supplemented these fortunes with other more traditional
sources of racketeering income: gambling, loan-sharking, blackmail, and pizzu, or payment for
protection").
336. See LAURENCE LEAMER, THE KENNEDY MEN: 1901-1963: THE LAWS OF THE FATHER
38-42 (2001) (detailing Joe Kennedy's acquisition of a fortune through liquor smuggling and
describing his view of the Volstead Act instituting prohibition as "a regressive piece of legislation,
targeted at the poor and foreign"); RONALD KESSLER, THE SINS OF THE FATHER: JOSEPH P.
KENNEDY AND THE DYNASTY HE FOUNDED 36 (1996) (describing Joe Kennedy's dealings with
Mafia boss Frank Costello to illegally import liquor during prohibition).
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illegal activities, as well. 3 3 7 The rise of Jews, Italians, Irish and other ethnic
groups from p.overty into the mainstream through organized and petty crime is
well known. 33 8 The repression of the Black community
requires that this
3 39
avenue of potential economic advancement be closed off.
c. The Geopolitics of Drug Trafficking
To fully understand the significance of the drug trade and the oppression of
African people and other people of color, one must recognize the central role
drug trafficking has played in the European conquest of other cultures and the
maintenance of white supremacy worldwide. 34 0 Addictive and deleterious
substances have historically been used to undermine non-European societies and
further white interests. 34 1 In this connection, drugs can be used to weaken a
country or culture internally and limit its ability to resist white economic or

337. Indeed, most of the so-called "robber barons" of late 19 ' century American were so
named because of the improper wheeling and dealing that accompanied the acquisition of their great
fortunes. See generally MATHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934) (describing fraudulent
and corrupt practices that led to the establishment of 19th century fortunes); GUSTAVUS MEYERS,
HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES (1936) (depicting Vanderbilt, Gould, Astor,
Rockerfeller, Duke and others as immoral men who acquired their fortunes through deceit and
thievery). Meyers reports that J.P. Morgan, for example, enlarged his inherited fortune through a
fraudulent sale of the government's own useless and discarded rifles back to the army during the
Civil War. MEYERS, supra at 553. Then, "[b]y means of financial laws corruptly passed, [Morgan
and other financiers] compelled the people of the United States ... to present them with the funds
with which to buy up railroads and other forms of property" for their own personal enrichment.
MEYERS, supra at 554.
338. One author describes the wide-spread criminal activity by immigrant ethnic groups in
the United States as a tried and true means of social advancement:
In the major urban centers there had been a distinct ethnic sequence in organized crime
membership. While it may be true that membership in criminal activity during the
1930s and 1940s was often of Italian origin; twenty years before, Eastern European
Jews were the most prominent; and before the Jews, the Irish were dominant. As each
group acquired the wealth and social position accompanying the profits of illicit
activity, they invested in legitimate businesses and assumed a greater political role in
the dominant, legitimate society. Criminal activity became a method of social
climbing.
David R. Wade, The Conclusion that a Sinister Conspiracy of Foreign Origin Controls Organized
Crime: The Influence of Nativism in the Kefauver Committee Investigation, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
371, 384 (1996).
339. The economic threat to white power is not limited to illegal drugs, but to any
commodity that the African community produces or distributes. Thus, once drug use is associated
with a given culture, then that drug use must be suppressed lest it develop into a potential economic
engine that can be used for economic advancement.
340. See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN
THE AMERICAS 247 (1997) (stating alcohol has been "consciously used since colonial times as a sort
of 'chemical weapon' to dissipate indigenous societies").
341. See id at 405 (describing the "deliberate use of alcohol to effect the dissolution of
many of North America's indigenous peoples"). See also LYNN PAN, ALCOHOL IN COLONIAL
AFRICA 7-9 (1975) (describing the use of alcohol first as a currency to acquire slaves and later as a
means of providing economic support for colonial regimes).
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This classic use of drugs for political purposes is what

happened to China during the Opium Wars. 34 3 The supply of alcohol to Native
Americans in North America is also a primary example of the use of drugs for
34 4
oppression.
In more recent times, drugs have been used to advance the political
interests of European and European-derived countries in two additional wa 's
First, as a means to generate finances for covert or "off the book" activities,
and secondly, as a way to reward collaborators and favored parties in countries
under attack with a lucrative franchise. 346 In 1946, the French began a secret
war against the Viet Minh in Indochina, which they financed by taking over the
opium trade in that region. 347 The covert action branch of the French
intelligence service, Service d'action, transported large amounts of opium into

Saigon and used the profits from the drug trade for covert operations. 348 The
United States used the same tactics when it inherited the Indochinese war from
the French. 3 4 9 To support its mercenary armies, the CIA ferried the opium its
clients produced out of the hills of Laos to urban markets. 3 5
The CIA later

relied on heroin smuggling to finance covert operations in Afghanistan and
cocaine trafficking to fund military support for the Nicaraguan Contras.

35 1

342. See Wilbur R. Jacobs, The Fatal Confrontation: Early Native-White Relations on the
Frontiers of Australia, New Guinea and America-A Comparative Study, in THE FATAL
CONFRONTATION: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN INDIANS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND
HISTORIANS 52 (Wilbur R. Jacobs, ed. 1996) (describing depopulation and despondency from

disease and alcoholism as a key stage in the subjugation of native people by whites).
343.

See DUKE & GROSS, supranote 16, at 80.

344. See Churchill, supra note 340. An extensive treatment of the practice of using alcohol
for cultural domination may be found in WILLIAM E. UNRAU, WHITE MAN'S WICKED WATER: THE
ALCOHOL TRADE AND PROHIBITION IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 1802-92 (1996). Unrau states: "Alcohol
figured prominently in the European invasion of North America. It was endemic wherever the
French, British, or Dutch established New World beach heads and deployed policies for cultural
alteration and economic gain." Id.
345. See PETER DALE SCOTT & JONATHAN MARSHALL, COCAINE POLITICS: DRUGS,
ARMIES, AND THE CIA IN CENTRAL AMERICA 171 (updated paperback ed. 1998) (charging
intelligence agencies use narcotics as "common coin for the purposes of espionage, paramilitary
operations, covert trade and counterintelligence").
346. See id. at 186 (alleging that "[s]ince the 1940s... government intelligence connections
have opened up unsupervised shipping and plane communications between the United States and
drug-growing areas and conferred protection on drug traffickers willing to ally themselves [to U.S.
interests]"); Alfred W. McCoy, From Free Trade to Prohibition:A CriticalHistory of the Modern
Asian Opium Trade, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 307, 329 (2000) (stating "covert agencies found urban
criminals and upland warlords useful allies in the prosecution of the Cold War, providing de facto
political protection for drug dealers in key source regions").
347.

ALFRED McCoY, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 92-97 (1972).

348.

Id. Some of this opium was even transported to criminal syndicates in France. Id. at

349.

Id. at 151-52.

350.

Id. at 153, 263, 285-87.

351.

LUSANE, supranote 1, at 119-23. Thus, while the U.S. claimed to be waging a war on

96.
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Many in the African American community have long believed that the
United States government has been implicated in the drug epidemics that have
35
swept through the Black community over the years. 2 Many African
Americans have reached this conclusion after observing the correlation between
periods of high Black political activism swiftly followed by periods of easy drug
availability in the Black community. 353 In August of 1996, news reports
surfaced that stoked African American fears that the government was behind the
influx of drugs into the Black community. 354 Gary Webb wrote a series of
stories in the San Jose Mercury News, alleging that the government was
allowing Nicaraguan Contra supporters to smuggle crack into south-central Los
355
Angeles in order to support their war against the Nicaraguan government.
"For the better part of a decade," wrote Webb, "a San Francisco Bay Area drug
ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles
and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerilla army run by
drugs, it was simultaneously waging a war with drugs. As Peter Scott and Jonathan Marshall note in
their informative study of U.S. involvement in Central American cocaine trafficking, the reliance on
the drug trade was not incidental-it was fundamental to the American intelligence structure. They
point out that:
[T]he long and sordid history of CIA involvement with the Sicilian Mafia, the French
Corsican underworld, the heroin producers of Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, the
marijuana-and cocaine-trafficking Cuban exiles of Miami, and the opium smuggling
mujaheddin of Afghanistan simply reinforces the lesson of the Contra period: far from
considering drug networks their enemy, U.S. intelligence organizations have made
them an essential ally in the covert expansion of American influence abroad.
SCOTT & MARSHALL, supra note 345, at 4. Alfred McCoy also argues that CIA involvement in the
drug trade is longstanding. According to McCoy: "[O]ver the past forty years American and allied
intelligence agencies have played a significant role in protecting and expanding the global drug
traffic. CIA cover operations in key drug producing areas have repeatedly restrained or blocked
DEA efforts to deal with the problem." ALFRED W. McCoY, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN: CIA
COMPLICITY INTHE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE 491 (1991).

352.

LUSANE, supra note 1,at 13.

353. Id. According to Lusane, there is "ample historical evidence" of such a correlation. He
notes that "as the Civil Rights and Black Power movements of the Sixties gained momentum and
after the urban rebellions in the major cities, more illegal drugs entered the Black community than at
any other time in history." Id.
354. See ALEXANDER COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIR, WHITE OUT: THE CIA, DRUGS,
AND THE PRESS 63 (1998) (describing the Black community's reaction to "Dark Alliance" story).
355. Gary Webb, 'Crack' Plague's Roots are in Nicaraguan War, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Aug. 18, 1996 at, Al [hereinafter Webb, Crack Plague]; Gary Webb, Testimony Links US. to
Drugs-Guns Trade, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 18, 1996; Gary Webb, Shadowy Origins of
"Crack" Epidemic, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 19, 1996; Gary Webb, Drug Agent Thought

She Was on to Something Big, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 19, 1996; Gary Webb, Drug Expert:
"Crack"Born in SF Bay Area in '74, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 19, 1996; Gary Webb, War

on Drugs' UnequalImpact on Black Contra Case, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 20, 1996; Gary
Webb, SF Bay Area Man Tangled in Drug Web, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 20, 1996. The
Mercury News retracted the "Dark Alliance" stories in 1997. See Mark Jurowitz, Repudiated Stores
No Longer Fade Away, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 1998, at DI. As a result, these articles are no
longer available on the Mercury News website or from proprietary databases, such as Westlaw or
Lexis. However, Gary Webb has posted a reproduction of the original "Dark Alliance" website,
at
News,
Mercury
the
in
published
initially
articles
all
including
http://home.attbi.com/-gary.webb/drugs/start.htm.
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the CIA." 3 5 6 The stories caused a sensation at the time and led to the
extraordinary appearance of CIA Director John Deutch at a town hall meeting in
south-central Los Angeles in an attempt to defuse the anger of the Black

community. 357 Although Webb's story was viciously attacked in some quarters,
it was just the tip of the iceberg. 3 58
Both preceding and subsequent
investigations have bolstered Webb's disclosures and expanded the range of

government culpability.

359

While the government was trumpeting its War on Drugs and an anti-drug
culture ideology, 36 it was in fact deeply involved in the drug trade. 36 1 The
government had organized and financed organizations that were importing

356.

Webb, Crack Plague, supranote 355, at Al.

357.

COCKBURN & ST. CLAIR, supranote 354, at 2, 84-89.

358. Webb's stories received "extraordinary" criticism in the mainstream press, including
attacks published in the New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Washington Post. SCOTT &
MARSHALL, supra note 345, at viii. The attacks, described as "one of the most venomous and
factually inane assaults on a professional journalist's competence in living memory," are reviewed at
length by investigative reporters Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair in their 1998 book White
Out. See COCKBURN & ST. CLAIR, supra note 354, at 29-62. In a nutshell, the criticism of Webb's
account was a smokescreen, which focused on details and failed to blunt the thrust of his argument.
As two reporters later remarked:
But even Webb's harshest critics had to concede-as the San FranciscoExaminer had
first documented ten years earlier-that Meneses and his colleagues did bring large drug
shipments into the country, that they did meet with top CIA Contra proteges, that they
gave at least tens of thousands of dollars to the Contra cause, and that they were given
extraordinary special treatment by U.S. federal prosecutors. SCOTT & MARSHALL,
supra note 345, at viii.
359. See generally SCOTT & MARSHALL, supra note 345; COCKBURN & ST. CLAIR, supra
note 354. The CIA's own report to Congress on the Contra-drug connection admits that the CIA had
information that the Contra leadership was involved in drug trafficking, but failed to investigate
these reports or inform the proper agencies of this knowledge. James Risen, C.I.A. Reportedly
Ignored Charges of Contra Drug Dealing in '80's, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A7. According to
Alfred McCoy:
The question is not whether the Contra war against the Sandinista government became
involved in drug trafficking, but in what way and in what degree. The State
Department adopted the minimalist position that a few people somehow affiliated with
the Contras may have been involved with cocaine. Better-informed agencies, the DEA
and the CIA, reported that leading Contra commanders were major traffickers.
McCoy, supra note 351, at 480.
360. The War on Drugs has been described as a "one-way, mass-mediated, multifaceted
public relations campaign designed to influence public opinions regarding the issue of 'the drug
problem."' ELWOOD, supra note 40, at 10. The core rhetorical feature of this public relations
campaign was the "just say no to drugs" crusade initiated by Nancy Reagan. See id. at 1, 84-87
(describing "just say no" campaign). Although the "just say no" slogan was ubiquitous, see id. at 1
(claiming "just say no" at one time was one of the two most popular sayings in the country), there is
no evidence of its effectiveness. See id. at 11 (claiming that "the children following the "just say no"
generation increasingly are getting high any way they can"). Patti Davis, Nancy Reagan's daughter,
speculates that the "just say no" campaign was a subconscious "cry for help" from Nancy Reagan,
who was battling a long time addiction to prescription tranquilizers, and White House aid Michael
Deaver, who was engaged in his own struggle with alcohol. Id at 75-76.
361.

See supranotes 354-59 and accompanying text.
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massive amounts of drugs into the African American community and the
government looked the other way while they did it.3 62 At the same time, the
government was vigorously enforcing harsh drug laws that led to police
harassment and intimidation of African American communities and the mass
arrest and incarceration of low-level drug dealers. 363 These law enforcement
efforts had enormously deleterious effects on the entire African American
community and did little to stem the tide of illegal drugs. 364 Consequently, the
Black community was targeted by a vicious three-pronged assault; a drug
epidemic with all of the attendant social, health and economic costs; a draconian
prosecution-centered drug policy that did not stop the flow of illegal drugs and
exacerbated the Black community's social and economic problems; and the
callous exploitation of the African American community's misery to advance the
government's larger geo-political ends.
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF RACE AND CRIME

The preceding analysis has disclosed two observable features of the War on
Drugs. First, that given a choice between demand-reduction and supplyreduction strategies, United States policy makers chose harsh supply-reduction
measures and implemented those supply-reduction policies in ways that heavily
affected young urban African and Hispanic males. Second, that the drug war's
supply-reduction policies were implemented in a cultural environment which
has historically associated non-white peoples with drugs, and used this
association to justify their subjugation and control. The remaining parts of this
article examine whether these dual features of the War on Drugs can be
explained theoretically. A workable theory of race and crime would predict
these outcomes and show why the criminal justice system operates, as it does, in
a racialized way.365
362.

See supra notes 354-59 and accompanying text.

363. See supra notes 74-111 and accompanying text. See also Nunn, supra note 13, at 1491
(arguing War on Drugs has led to police harassment and intimidation of African American
communities); Tovah Renee Calderon, Race-Based Policingfrom Terry to Wardlow: Steps Down
the Totalitarian Path, 44 HOw. L. J. 73 (2000) (arguing African Americans and Hispanics are
intimidated and victimized by police targeting and disparate sentencing).
364. Lisa R. Nakdai, Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messengerfor the
Sake of the Message? 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 557, 564-65 (2001) (arguing harsh drug laws do not
deter drug crimes and mainly incarcerate low-level, non-violent offenders); powell & Hershenov,
supra note 7, at 565-67 (arguing "the war on drugs has done little to slow, much less stem, the tide of
the drug trade" and instead has inflicted great suffering on the African American community); Nunn,
supra note 13, at 1485-86 (arguing War on Drugs "had little effect on the amount of drug use or the
amount of drugs brought into the country" and instead caused "many more African American males
[to go to] jail, greater violence as the transaction costs of the drug trade skyrocketed, and greater
police repression"); TONRY, supra note 44, at 81-82 (claiming although "there is no evidence that
crime control efforts lowered the levels of drug use... [t]he War on Drugs foreseeably and
unnecessarily blighted the lives of hundreds of thousands of young disadvantaged black Americans
and undermined decades of efforts to improve the life chances of the urban black underclass").
365. See Nunn, Darden Dilemma, supra note 13, at 1479-80 (claiming that "[n]ot only is
[the criminal justice system] racist, but arguably it is one of the most racist institutions in the United
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A. Crime and the Definition of Society
What is often overlooked, particularly in legal analyses of the criminal
justice system, is that crime is not simply a product of a given society, but that
crime plays an important socially constitutive role. 366 That is, crime, both in its
occurrence and in its imagining, helps make society what it is. 367 Crime plays a
central role in constructing the society we live in and ordering the power
relationships within that society. 368 Crime does this by allowing authority to
govern in coercive ways without making it appear to do so. 369 This is best
understood through the deployment of the concept of the "consensus," as it is
3 70
understood within the discipline of cultural studies.
1. Crime and the Consensus
The "consensus" is a term that describes the prevailing ideology or
worldview of the society at large. 37 1 The term is attributed to Stuart Hall, and
grew out of the approach to Gramscian hegemony developed within the
Birmingham School of cultural studies. 372 The "consensus" is "the accepted
parameters of social conduct and the established view of the purposes and
functions of the institutions of society." 373 However, consensus is not simply a
description of what might be called popular opinion.374 The consensus
describes a relationship of power. 375 That is to say, the prevailing ideology only
prevails because it is compatible with the preexisting institutions of power and

States").
366. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 764-65 (arguing that traditional views of
crime focus on individuals who threaten violence to persons or property).
367. See id. at 763 (asserting that crime helps determine the borders of the law-abiding
community).

368.

See id

369. See id at 763-64 (explaining how crime helps the state to govern with the appearance
of legitimacy).
370.

1have examined this concept extensively in Nunn, Trialas Text, supra note 68, at 761-

371.

Id. at 761.

64.

372. See Stuart Hall, The Rediscovery of "Ideology": The Return of the Repressed in Media
Studies, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 56, 61-65 (Michael Gurevitch, et al., eds. 1982)
(explaining origins of term "consensus"). For an explanation of the role of the Birmingham School
in cultural studies, see Kenneth B. Nunn, Illegal Aliens: Extraterrestrialsand White Fear,48 FLA.
L. R. 397, 399 (1996) [hereinafter Nunn, Illegal Aliens].
373.

Nunn, Trialas Text, supranote 68, at 761.

374. See STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE AND LAW AND
ORDER 215 (1978).

375. Id.
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authority that exist in any given society. 376 But the relationship is not onesided. 3 77 Consensus can only emerge through authority and power, 37 8 and
power can only operate through the consensus. 379 Thus, the following is true:
Coercion, then, is the flip side of consent and consent is the flip side of
coercion. Power relies on the consensus to govern because without
consent it cannot govern efficiently. But for power to govern in its
own interest, the consensus must allow
it to do so. Thus, power seeks
38
to shape and direct the consensus. 0
Crime contributes to the formation of the consensus. First, crime "allows a
community to determine its norms and 'label' other conduct as deviant." 38 1 This
labeling process allows the dominant group to clothe its values and priorities
with the guise of morality. 382 Those that violate these norms may then be
stigmatized and punished, not simply because they do not conform to the norms,
but because they are immoral. 38T Secondly, having labeled some conduct as
deviant, crime then sets the boundaries of the consensus, or law-abiding
society. 384 The corollary of defining certain conduct as criminal is to define
other conduct as acceptable, thus creating the substance of civil society. 385 In
addition, "crime plays a crucial defining role in the construction of the
ideological representations of society. '386 That is crime provides a way to
signify or make a statement, about the righteousness of given social behavior
with a definite political content. 387 Thus, crime has enormous power. It has the
388
power to draw lines and it has the power to mobilize people against it.
The

376. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 762 (describing process through which elite
views become accepted by the masses).

377.

See id.

378. See id. at 763 (explaining that the construction of consensus is "controlled
predominantly by the state through its control of educational and cultural institutions").
379. HALL ET AL., supra, note 374, at 203 (asserting that the state cannot govern through the
raw exercise of power alone).
380.

See Nunn, Trial as Text, supranote 68, at 762 (citations omitted).

381.

Id. at 759-60.

382. Id. at 760 (arguing that "labeling process serves to mobilize moral censure" and to help
create a "moral community").
383.

This labeling process is, of course, contested. See id. at 760 n.84.

384. See id.at 764 (stating that "crime as a category helps determine the borders of the
consensus").
385.
'us'.").

See id. at 760 ("As crime creates and excludes 'them' it also creates and strengthens

386.

Nunn, Trialas Text, supranote 68, at 763.

387.

Id.

388.

Id.
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support of the community can always be rallied to address crime. 389 This power
the community and present a consensus
allows crime to mask differences within
39
with a false sense of homogeneity. 0
2. Power and the Definition of Crime
The power of crime to mobilize the community makes it desirable for the
state to seek out its services. 39 1 Thus, the state holds a virtual monopoly on the
formal mechanisms for defining crime. 392 Consequently, it can be said that
crime "provides hegemonic services for the state." 39 3 Yet, these hegemonic
services are limited. 394 This limitation arises because the definition of crime is
socially constructed through a process that is politically contested. 395 Different
groups compete to have their definitions of crime predominate. 39 6 They
compete to control the state apparatus, (the formal lawmaking process) and they
compete to establish the dominant cultural definition of crime to which the state
397
must respond.
While the state definition of crime is contested, the process of labeling,
defining crime and consensus formation is nonetheless heavily weighted in favor
of the state and dominant groups. 398 The definition of crime and the formation
of the consensus results from a semiotic process of articulation. 399 Each
potential definition of crime is dependent upon definitions that have been
expressed before. 40 As expressed here, new meanings must draw on the "social
reservoir of ideas:"
Any new meaning is of necessity constrained by the meanings that
have been articulated before. In other words, meaning is constructed

389.

Id.

390.

Id

391.

Id. at 764.

392.

Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 765.

393.

Drew Humphries, Report on the Conference of the European Group for the Study of

Deviance andSocial Control, 1 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 11, 12 (1974).

394. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 764 (explaining state has advantages but no
monopoly over the production of consensus).
395.

Id.

396. See id. at 764-65 (describing how definition of crime is arrived at through the
consensus).
397. See id at 765 (stating that the definition of crime "derives from the political give and
take generated as various interests compete for control of the state apparatus").
398.

See id at 766 (arguing that alternative views of crime "generally lack credibility").

399. See id at 767 (describing how the definition of crime is produced through a "semiotic
process of articulation").
400. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 767-68 (stating views of crime based on
foundational notions cloaked with commonsense).
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from concepts that already exist within the social reservoir of ideas.
In order to be understood, even to be conceived of in the first instance,
40 1
all new ideas must be built on the ideas of the past.
Individuals contribute ideas about crime to the social reservoir of ideas on a
differential basis.40 2 Some individuals have greater access to the public
consciousness than others. 403 Stuart Hall refers to those who contribute to our
conceptualization of crime as the "definers of crime." 40 4 These definers of
crime may be placed in different classes. "Primary definers" are high status
figures of authority within a given culture. 405 Primary definers are usually
government officials or mainstream academics associated with elite educational
institutions, foundations or think tanks. 40 6 Primary definers are "considered to
have greater expertise and to have access to more accurate or more specialized
'40 7
information to particular topics than the majority of the population. "
"Secondary definers" are those, like the media, who "reproduce as secondary
sources the definitions established by primary definers." 4 08 Finally, a class of
"counter-definers" can be identified, made up of dissidents, radical academics,
minority group spokespersons and the like.40 The counter-definers produce
alternative views of crime, but their ability to do so is restricted, first because
they cannot easily access the media, but more importantly because they "must
respond in terms pre-established by the primary definers and the privileged
4 10
definitions."
Consequently, while the definition of crime is worked and reworked
through a semiotic process of articulation controlled by no one, the state has a
clear advantage. 4 11 The state and the dominant groups that control the state are
able to articulate their definition of crime more frequently and with greater
authority. 4 12 Yet, this advantage held by the state is not the same thing as
instrumental control. 4 13 The definition of crime remains a politically contested
401.

Nunn, IllegalAliens, supranote 372, at 401.

402. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 766-67 (describing distinction between
primary, secondary and counter-definers).

403.

Id.

404.

Id. at 766.

405.

Id.

406. Id.

407. Id.
408.

Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 766.

409.

Id. at 766-67.

410.

HALL ET AL., supra note 374, at 64.

411. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 766 (claiming that opinions and view points
of primary definers more likely to be treated as authoritative).
412.

Id.

413.

Id.
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reality. 4 14 Crime, then, is not what the state wants it to be, but what it is socially
constructed as.415
3. Crime, Authority, and Legitimation
While the definition of crime is not itself an instrumental process, it would
be a mistake to conclude that the state does not use crime instrumentally. 4 16 As
mentioned earlier, crime is frequently used to rally the support of the
population. 4 17 The threat of crime is used to gain legitimacy for the government
or its policies and practices. 4 18 Behavior that the government finds threatening
in one way or another can be made criminal, not simply to detain and arrest
those who engage in the behavior, but to change the attitude of the public toward
the behavior. 4 19 Certain groups or individuals, particularly those viewed as
subversive or threatening to the dominant order in some way, can be further
ostracized by their designation as criminals. 420 This process only works, of
course, so long as the state acts congruently with the consensus. 42 1 If the state
were to go against the consensus and seek to demonize a favored group in
society it would simply undermine its own legitimacy in the eyes of those who
422
are governed.
B. The Symbiotic Relationship of Race and Crime
Even with an understanding of the multiple ways in which crime can be
used and with the recognition that the definition of crime is politically contested,
our theory of race and crime is not yet complete. For within this interactive
network of meaning, race plays a particularly important role. Race forms a
special relationship with crime, which enhances the ideological function of both
of these socially constructed categories. In this relationship, race helps to define
crime, and crime helps to define race.

414.

See id. at 765 (describing definition of crime as "politically contingent").

415. Id. at 764 (asserting that the definition of crime is arrived at through a semiotic process,
"in which the state has distinct advantages, although no monopoly").
416.

Id.at 763 (describing how crime can be used to rally the support of the community).

417.

See supra notes 387-90 and accompanying text.

418.

See Nunn, Trialas Text, supra note 68, at 764 (describing how the consensus can gain

legitimacy for the state's definition of crime).
419. See id. at 760 (describing how crime reinforces the "internal solidarity of the moral
community").
420.

See id. (discussing ostracization of drug abuse and drug users).

421. This is so because "for [the state] to govern in its own interest, the consensus must
allow it to do so." Id. at 762.
422. The state would undermine its legitimacy since the consensus is the means through
which legitimacy is granted. See id.
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1. Crime as a Definer of Race
In addition to establishing the boundaries of the consensus, crime functions
as a means of defining race. Once conduct is defined as criminal, it is then
excluded from the consensus. 4 23 It is behavior in which law-abiding citizens,
who are within the cultural mainstream do not engage. 424 But, this conceptual
4 25
distinction does not apply to persons who are part of the racialized "other."
The "other" is impressed with the negative characteristics that those who occupy
the center, or who are within the consensus, wish to exclude. 4 2 6 That is, race
and crime share the same conceptual space within the discourse of social
formation. 4 2 7 They are both outside of the center, and the demarcation of one
42 8
lends itself to the social construction of the other.
Crime, then, is intimately associated with race. 4 2 9

Crime sets the borders

of race and crime is language that constitutes the definition of race. 4 3 0 African

Americans, in articular, have been defined by their proclivity to commit certain
criminal acts. 4 3
Americans. 4 32

Theft, rape, and drug use have all been associated with African
Floyd Weatherspoon describes the white culture's view of

African American males succinctly: "Generally, stereotypical attitudes and
feelings from white Americans and foreigners are that black males are overly
aggressive, violent, involved in drugs, dishonest, shiftless and lazy, desirous of
433
white women, lacking in work ethics, and are often rapists and criminals."
Without crime it would be difficult to describe African Americans other
than in physical terms. Crime gives content to the image of African Americans
produced in western cultures. 4 3 4 In fact, the very notion of race is determined

423. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing crime and
the consensus).
424.

See id

425. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the
JuvenileJustice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 679 (2002) [hereinafter Nunn, The Child as Other].
426. Id. at 692 (noting Foucaultian argument that Western societies construct undesirables
out of negative qualities in order to normalize the center).
427. See Crenshaw, supra note 293, at 1373 (discussing criminality as part of a Black
counter-image to whites).
428.

See id.

429. See generally KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES,
WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT AND OTHER MICROAGGRESSIONS xiii
(1998) (exploring link between Blackness and criminality).
430. See MILLER, supra note 97, at 149 ("Replete with images of dark-skinned predators,
crime has become a metaphor for race").
431. Roberts, supra note 8, at 810 (stating "Blacks are presumed to be lawless and are
entitled to fewer liberties").
432.

Weatherspoon, supra note 2, at 28.

433.

Id.

434.

See Crenshaw, supra note 293; FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 75
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435
by socially constructed notions of crime.

2. Race as a Definer of Crime
While crime is a definer of race, at the same time, race is a definer of
crime. That is, those acts that are conceived of as criminal, as being outside of
the consensus, are often the very acts that are associated with African people and
other people of color. 4 3 6 According to Dorothy Roberts, a leading criminal law
theorist, the very meaning of crime is racially determined:
Not only is race used in identifying criminals, it is also used in
defining crime. In other words, race does more than predict a person's
propensity for committing neutrally defined offenses. Race is built
into the normative foundation of the criminal law. Race becomes part
of society's determination of what conduct to
define as criminal.
437
Crime is actually constructed according to race.
Consequently, conduct can become criminalized simply because African
people engage in that conduct-either because negative connotations are supplied
to the conduct through it's association with African people, or because
controlling the conduct is desirable as a means to control Africans. 438 Nowhere
is this more apparent than in connection with drugs. 439 The previously
described association of the Chinese with opium, Chicanos with marijuana, and
440
Africans with cocaine led to the criminalization of these substances.
Furthermore, when the same substances (at least in the case of marijuana and
cocaine) began being used by white youths in the 1960s and 70s, then there
was
44 1
a movement to decriminalize them and provide drug treatment programs.

(asserting Blacks have been constructed as criminal since the first century of slavery).
435. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 74-75, 105-16 (discussing criminal
behavior as a constitutive part of white racist imagery of African people).
436. See RICHEY MANN, supra note 100, at 132-33 (describing legislation that
disproportionately impacted people of color and concluding that "minority people commit crimes
that are created for them.").
437.

Roberts, supra note 161, at 1954.

438. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 1483 (claiming that "activities that African
Americans are more likely to engage in are those that are more likely to be criminalized").
439.

See supra notes 292-364 and accompanying text.

440.

See supra notes 251-88 and accompanying text.

441. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 61-62
(describing drop in white marijuana arrest rates in early 1970s and arguing that a major factor
contributing to the decriminalization of marijuana was "undoubtedly a realization that the arrestees
were too often the children of individuals, usually white, in positions of power and influence").
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3. Consequences from the Combination of Race and Crime
The fact that race defines crime, and crime defines race, produces three
consequences that are worth examining. The first is the production of racism
from the intersection of race and crime. The second is the criminogenic effect
of racism, and the third is the obscuration and legitimation of racist oppression.
a. Crime and the Productionof Racism
Crime as a social phenomenon creates racism. 442 When crime occurs,
whites generally associate Blacks and certain other people of color with criminal
activity. 443 This association creates animus in the white community towards
people of color.

444

This is observable in every public opinion survey about

44 5

Substantial portions of the white majority have repeatedly admitted
racism.
that they dislike or are suspicious of Blacks and Hispanics because they believe
these groups cause crime.

446

Crime causes fear and fear is the chief ingredient in racism. 447 This is true
whether the criminal behavior feared by the white majority is behavior that is
indigenous to the African American community or something that was imposed
on that community by the policies and practices of the white majority. 448 It is
the prevalence of crime in communities of color and, more specifically, the
of color that has
representation of crime as the unique province of communities
449
fostered and encouraged racism in American society.
442. Professor Joe Feagin argues that specific anti-Black images, particularly the images of
Black criminals, "are part of a broader racial ideological structure" that "buttress the ideology,
undergird white privilege, and generate discriminatory practices." FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra
note 332, at 105.
443. See DORIS A. GRABER, CRIME NEWS AND THE PUBLIC 55 (1980) (reporting findings of
1977 study that most respondents viewed crime as work of young Black males or young males of
other communities of color); Jody P. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Baysians and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994) (citing 1990
University of Chicago study which found over 56% of Americans believe Blacks to be more
violence prone); RUSSELL, supra note 429, at 125 ("Studies show the closer Whites live to Blacks,
the more fearful they are of crime.").
444. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332 at 113 (White stereotypes of Blacks as
criminals "has rationalized much discrimination."). Cf RUSSELL, supra note 429 at 124-27
(claiming white fear of Black crime is irrational and should not excuse white racist views).
445. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supranote 332, at 107-10, 113-16 (describing historic and
current attitudes toward perceived Black criminality).
446.

Id.

447. See JOE R. FEAGIN ET AL., WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS 50 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing
fear as motivating factor for white racist violence); MILTON KLEG, HATE, PREJUDICE AND RACISM
181-83 (1993) (discussing fear of others as one of the causes of racist thought and behavior).
448. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 1486 (suggesting Black crime is result of
white social policies).
449. See FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 113 (representation of Black men as
criminals "has rationalized much discrimination over the centuries").
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b. Racism and the Creationof Crime
Racism produces crime in ways that go beyond that definitional sense we
have already discussed. White racism-that is animus toward African Americans
and other people of color-leads to racist oppression. 450 Racist oppression is
made up of those social practices that are designed to subjugate and punish a
disfavored group, 45 1 to enable those who hold racist sentiments to experience
the pleasure of superiority. 452 The history of the United States is replete with
examples of the use of the criminal justice system as an instrument of racist
oppression. 453 These include the imposition of the death penalty, police
brutality, the denial of the right to counsel, and the long and protracted struggle
to get African Americans on juries.4 54 Indeed, in a social landscape where the
occurrence of racism is, at least openly, discouraged, the criminaljustice system
455
may be one of the few venues where racist practices can continue.
Consequently, racism leads to the creation of crime in order to produce
opportunities for racist oppression. 456 The corollary in interpersonal relations
would be for a tormentor to invent transgressions so that he or she could inflict
more pain on his or her target. In the criminal justice system, racism calls for
more and more criminal offences, particularly offences of the character that
persons of color are likely to commit, and harsher and harsher criminal
4 57
punishments.

450. See id at 70 (describing how racist ideology structures "specific racial attitudes,
prejudices, and stereotypes").
451. See id. at 2 (describing "white racism" as "commonplace discriminatory practices of
individual whites, white images of dangerous blacks... and the white-dominated institutions that
allow or encourage such practices").
452. See Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REv. 457, 487
(1997) (describing racism as sadomasochistic pleasure). bell hooks similarly argues that whites hold
a contradictory view of Black male bodies-seeing them both as a threat and as "a location for
transgressive pleasure." bell hooks, Feminism Inside: Toward a Black Body Politic, in BLACK
MALE: REPRESENTATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ART 127, 131 (Thelma
Golden ed., 1994).
453. See RICHEY MANN, supra note 100, at 115-65 (detailing discrimination in laws, law
enforcement and the judicial system).
454.

See id

455. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 1480 (arguing that racism in the criminal
justice system can provide legitimacy and cover to racism elsewhere).
456.

This is clear from the central role that crime plays in racist oppression. See FEAGIN,

RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 107-13.

457. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 68, at 1488-89 (describing tough on crime attitudes
toward punishment).

HeinOnline -- 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 436 2002

Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality
c. Crime and the Legitimation of Racist Oppression
Crime produces racism and racism produces crime. 458 But crime does
more than simply produce racial animus toward disfavored groups. 459 Crime
plays a unique role in the whole structure of racist oppression.4 60 This46is1
creates.
because crime actually legitimates and masks the very racism it
Crime provides an easy and convenient excuse for racist attitudes and
behaviors. 462 As a result of the working and reworking of the consensus as
political ideas compete for acceptance, racism is currently a disfavored political
ideology. 463 Racism still holds tremendous sway as a persuasive force and even
464
more as a subterranean cause of conduct, either unrecognized or not admitted.
But this residual power of racist ideology must remain hidden and crime
provides the perfect hiding place. 4 65 Crime generates466race hatred and focuses it
so.
on its target, while claiming all along that it is not
Open racial animus toward a member of a non-white group is not
acceptable in most mainstream social circles, but animus toward a criminal is
not only acceptable, it is encouraged. 46 7 Even the most elite gentleman is free
to hate criminals and even slavery is all right, under the Constitution, if it is
imposed as a punishment for crime. 4 68 It matters not, in this analysis, whether
the ranks of criminals are disproportionately Black, or whether racial
discrimination contributed to the numbers of Africans entrapped in the
system. 469 The fact that they can be called criminals justifies the hatred directed
458. See supra notes 442-56 and accompanying text. See also Roberts, supra note 161, at
1947 (arguing that society "constructs crime in terms of race and race in terms of crime").
459.

See supra notes 442-49.

460. FEAGN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 105 (claiming that "specific anti-black
images," including the image of Black men as criminals, help constitute "a broader ideological
structure of racialized thinking").
461. See Nunn, Darden Dilemma, supra note 13, at 1480 (arguing that the criminal justice
system is "one of the principle causes of racism elsewhere in society, since it provides legitimacy
and cover to racist ideas and behaviors").
462.

See supranote 449.

463. See FEAG1N, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 110 (stating since "it is less socially
acceptable to publicly avow strong racist attitude ... many whites may reserve most of their
blatantly racist comments for the private sphere[ ]").
464.

(claiming racist views and behaviors still of consequence).
See id.

465.

See supranote 461 and accompanying text.

466.

See FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 110.

467. See 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883)
("The criminal law thus proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it
confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments which express it.").
468. The Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishmeniforcrime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the United
States .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I (emphasis added).
469.

See Nunn, Darden Dilemma, supra note 13, at 1482 (arguing that the disproportionate
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toward them.
Thus, cycling through a semiotic system of articulation, crime produces
racism, racism produces crime, and crime produces again more racism. At the
same time, crime also legitimizes the very racism it produces. Consequently,
the criminal justice system can easily be called the most significant source of
racism today, and its greatest protector. The criminal justice system is therefore
the weak link in any serious effort to rid American society of racism. Social
equality cannot be had unless the criminal justice system as refuge for racist
ideology is eliminated.
III. THE POOL OF SURPLUS CRIMINALITY AS EXPLANATORY TOOL

What I have argued thus far is that crime and race play a central role in
relations of power. I have claimed that the drug war is a race war47 1 and pointed
out that there is a long historical connection between drugs and the
demonization of African people as criminals. 472 I have also suggested that this
connection between drugs and race is not surprising, given the symbiotic
interconnectedness of race and crime. 473 In the way that race and crime have
been socially constructed through a process of articulation in American culture,
race and crime define and inform each other. 474 In addition, the ideological
aspect of race, racism, actually produces crime. 475 Crime, for its part, produces
476
racism, then legitimates that racism so that it disappears from view.
The theory of race and crime that I have presented can be further explained
by an idea I call the concept of surplus criminality. The concept of surplus
criminality holds that inchoate or surplus criminals are needed to play social
roles in American society necessitated by the intersection of race and crime.
The concept of surplus criminality is borrowed from a similar concept in
Marxist economic theory-the reserve army of labor. First, I describe the reserve
army of labor as it is expressed in Marxist thought. Then, I describe my concept
of surplus criminality and discuss its ability to predict criminal justice policy.
A. Marxism and the Theory of Surplus Labor
Marxists believe that capitalist economies go through an endless cycle of
numbers of African Americans under criminal justice control are due to racism).
470.

Id.

471.

See supra notes 31-243 and accompanying text.

472.

See supra notes 264-78 and accompanying text.

473.

See supra notes 423-41 and accompanying text.

474.

Id.

475. That is, racism causes certain behavior to be interpreted as criminal, creating the need
for criminal laws and other apparatuses of the criminal justice system to address a perceived crime
problem. See supra notes 450-57 and accompanying text.
476.

See supra notes 458-70 and accompanying text.
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contraction and expansion. 477 This is because capital investment, which drives
capitalist economies, will fluctuate in response to changes in the rate of
return. 4 78 When the economy is growing, the rate of return will be high and new
investment will flood into the economy.4 79 But the ready availability of capital
and the resulting rise in the capitalization of production reduce the rate of profit
and the return on investment. 4 80 Ultimately, the economy stagnates; 4 81 workers
are laid off, the consumer market shrinks, recession occurs and the system resets
itself 482

During economic growth cycles, the system needs labor power to meet the
demand for new production. 4 83 This labor power is provided by the reserve pool
of labor, the number of unemployed persons in the economy who are available
to work. 484 The demand for labor drives up wages and as economic growth
stabilizes, manufacturers seek to replace their higher labor cost through
mechanization and other capital investments. 485 This process accelerates as 4the
86
reserve pool of labor shrinks, driving the cost of labor even higher.
Consequently, the situation changes from one where new jobs are being created
and there is a labor demand, to one where jobs are being terminated and there is
a labor surplus. 4 87 The labor surplus is returned to the reserve pool of labor
where it resides in the guise of unemployed and underemployed workers until
488
economic conditions change sufficiently to create a new labor demand.
Capitalist economies need to maintain a reserve pool of labor to allow quick
economic expansion when conditions should warrant. 489 Thus, in a nutshell,

477. See BADE ONIMODE, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST POLITICAL ECONOMY 167
(1985) (explaining that under the assumptions of Marxist theory, economic crises are endemic to
capitalism and cannot be eliminated through better monetary management policies). For more in
depth treatments of the Marxist view of capitalist economic crises see ARGHIRI EMMANUEL,
PROFITS AND CRISES (1984)

and MICHAEL PERELMAN, MARX'S CRISES THEORY: SCARCITY,

LABOR, AND FINANCE (1987).
478.

ONIMODE, supra note 477, at 167.

479.

Id.at 169.

480.

Id.

481.

Id.

482.

Id.

483. ONIMODE, supra note 477, at 162 (stating "in this competitive drive for
accumulation.., the capitalist must exploit labour, constantly revolutionise his method of
production and create an industrial reserve army of unemployed workers for facilitating further
exploitation of labour").
484.

See id. See also TOM BOTrOMORE ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 422-

23 (1983) (describing the reserve army of labor).
485.

ONIMODE, supranote 477, at 164.

486.

Id.

487.

Id.

488.

Id.

489.

Id.
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Marxists argue that capitalist economies demand a permanent pool of
unemployed workers, to keep wages low and to provide needed labor power
during times of expansion.
B. The Pool of Surplus Criminality
Given the importance of crime to the maintenance of hegemony and the
construction of the consensus, an argument similar to that regarding the reserve
pool of labor in the economic field can be made regarding the need to identify
criminals in the cultural and political fields. In order for the entire cultural
process of consensus creation through labeling and articulation to occur, a group
of individuals who can be reasonably labeled, vilified and ostracized must be
found. 49 This group cannot be selected arbitrarily. It must be a group that can
be legitimately constructed as outsiders and deviants within the bounds of the
culture. 491
For the maintenance of order to be successful, the general public cannot
view the criminal justice apparatus as necessary to control the general
population. 492 If the general public believes this, then the criminal justice
apparatus is likely to be perceived as oppressive. 493 Thus, the success of the
policing enterprise is dependent on it being perceived as necessary to control
others-thatis, them and not us.494 The entire criminal justice apparatus must be
perceived as being necessary to protect society from a criminal class that is
4 95
fundamentally unlike law-abiding citizens.
This group of outsiders and deviants who are "fundamentally unlike lawabiding citizens" constitutes what I call "the pool of surplus criminality." They
are "surplus" to the extent that they stand ever ready to be denoted as criminals,
even when such labeling does not occur. When a crisis arises, however, they
can easily be identified as criminals, and when it recedes, they can swiftly melt
back into the background where they await the next crisis.
In a time of national crisis, a criminal class must already be present and
ready to be blamed. Society cannot wait for this class to be developed and it

490.

See HALL ET AL., supranote 374, at 86.

491. See id. at 162 ("The defence of the traditional world view with its appropriate
scapegoats does not take place by magic. The necessary connections have to be made, publicly
forged and articulated."). See also STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE
CREATION OF THE MODS AND THE ROCKERS 75 (1972) (arguing that the deviant's conduct "threatens
social reality" and is outside of the norm) and TOM DOUGLAS, SCAPEGOATS: TRANSFERRING BLAME
145-51 (1995) (discussing difference as cause of scapegoating within groups).
492. HALL ET AL., supra note 374, at 220 ("The capitalist state cannot remain securely
founded on the legitimacy of popular representation, and take severe and unusual measures to
contain a threat to its foundation which the vast majority of the population does not believe exists.").
493.

See id.

494. See id. at 161 (describing need for and creation of "Folk Devils" to bear social anxieties
and legitimize repression).
495.

See id.
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cannot wait for the group to be identified through a long and drawn out juridical
process. 496 In a crisis, power 497 has an agenda. Power will wish to exploit the
crisis to secure its authority and expand its reach. 4 98 Power may even generate a
crisis, or generate and regenerate a series of crises, in order to manipulate the
consensus to its advantage. 499 Consequently, power must 5constantly keep
potential criminals around to serve its interests when necessary. 00
The recurring War on Drugs is an example of this process of the conscious
creation and manipulation of crises by the state. 50 1 The threat of drugs can
always be used to mobilize and strengthen society. Yet the threat created by
drugs is only workable, is only "real," to the extent that it is perceived as an
external threat posed by an external "enemy" outside of the mainstream. 502 In
order for the drug threat to be invoked, a plausible and available scapegoat has
to be found. In other words, before the possession, sale, and use of drugs can be
criminalized, a group of potential criminals must be identified. In the case of the
War on Drugs, African Americans and other people of color provide that group
of potential criminals.
C. The Predictive Value of the Theory of Surplus Criminality
The concept of surplus criminality allows us to determine who will be
identified as a threat by the cultural processes at work in the social construction
of crime. Given the way that race and crime intersect in American culture,
African Americans comprise the most significant part of the pool of surplus
criminality in the United States. African Americans are labeled as deviant and
outside the consensus as a general proposition, but should any specific threat
arise, African Americans can also be associated with that threat. 50 3 While
496. See COHEN, supra note 491, at 74 ("The labellers.., have a ready-made stock of
images to draw upon.").
497.

By "power" I mean the state and those dominant groups that control the state.

498. See HALL ET AL., supra note 374, at 221 (describing how moral panics arise from social
or moral controversies that authorities sought to exploit in order to exert or re-exert control).
499. See id (stating "the 'moral panic' appears to us to be one of the principal forms of
ideological consciousness by means of which a 'silent majority' is won over to the support of
increasingly coercive measures on the part of the state...").
500. The process may not work as instrumentally as I describe here. That is, dominant
groups, by their sheer dominance, may create an alter ego, or "other," on whom to project their worst
fears. See generally Nunn, The Child as Other, supranote 425, at 690-99 (discussing the concept of
otherness). This "othering" will occur because it is part of a cultural dynamic and not because it is
planned by any particular person or group. Id. at 699.
501.

See HALL ET AL., supranote 374, at 222 (discussing drug use as a cause of panics).

502.

See supra note 431 and accompanying text.

503. See Nunn, The Child as Other, supranote 425, at 699 (noting "Blacks sometimes serve
as convenient political scapegoats"); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes without
Punishment: White Neighbors, Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 350
(2002) (discussing use of Blacks as scapegoats for white economic woes during the Great
Depression); Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of
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African Americans are part of American society, they are viewed suspiciously
and treated as merely provisional members of the polity. 50 4 When the necessity
presents itself, this provisional membership can be withdrawn.
African
50 5
American are thus always under suspicion and need to be policed closely.
The pool of surplus criminality not only applies to African Americans as a
group; it applies to them individually, as well. Individual African Americans
may find that as they go about their daily lives, they may come under suspicion
for a variety of real and imagined criminal and antisocial acts. 5 06 For example,
50 7
it will be assumed that the African American employee is pilfering goods,

violating departmental rules and breaking social taboos like those governing
sexual relations in the workplace. 50 8

African Americans

are considered

members of the pool of surplus criminality, regardless of class or social
position. 50 9 Black males, for example, are viewed as potentially involved in the
51
drug trade, whether they are part of the middle class or the urban poor. 0

Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 970-71 (2000) (discussing the role and function of
identifying threats with particular groups, especially "[B]lacks, whom society often makes the social
scapegoats for its ills").
504. See FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 332, at 126 ("Whites maintain a positive
sense of self and their claims to greater privileges and resources while fending off what whites see as
illegitimate black demands for a fair share of those resources.").
505. See Maclin, supra note 171, at 386 ("Blacks correctly see pretextual stops as another
sign that police officers view blacks, particularly black males, as criminals who deserve singular
scrutiny and treatment as second class citizens."); Roberts, supra note 8, at 811 (arguing that order
maintenance policing "helps to reinforce the second class citizenship of Blacks and other people of
color").
506. See Armour, supra note 443, at 787 (discussing "widespread exclusion of blacks from
shops and taxicabs by anxious shopkeepers and cabdrivers" as exemplars of white suspicions derived
from cultural stereotypes). Such acts of racial profiling may be specific examples of what
psychologists refer to as "microaggressions," or those "subtle, minor, stunning automatic assaults...
by which whites stress blacks unremittingly and keep them on the defensive, as well as in a
psychologically reduced condition." Address by C. Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty-Three Years of
Stress, Solomon Carter Fuller Lectures, American Psychiatry Association Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (May 12, 1986), quoted in Richard Delgado, CriticalLegal Studies and the Realities ofRaceDoes the Fundamental ContradictionHave a Corollary?23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 408 n.3
(1988). For a treatment of common microaggressions and their treatment in the law, see Peggy C.
Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L. J. 1559, 1561-71 (1989) (describing common
stereotypes and how they lead to biased behavior).
507. See Deseriee Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil
Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L. REV. 275, 276 (2001) (describing "consumer discrimination" as the
practice of assuming African customers are potential thieves and treating them accordingly).
508.

See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,

UNEQUAL 121 (expanded and rev. ed. 1995) (asserting that reasons why white employers refuse to

hire African men include the failure of black men generally to fit into white norms of appearance
and behavior, and "that having black men and white women work together might lead to familiar
relationships ...").
509. Consequently, "[b]lack men know they are liable to be stopped at anytime..." by the
police, and that hostile treatment by the police "applies to black men of all economic strata,
regardless of their level of education, and whatever their job status or place in the community."
Maclin, supra note 164, at 253.
510.

See Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International
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The theory of the surplus criminality allows us to see that all African
Americans are viewed as potential criminals. Whether the issue is the drug war,
street crime, welfare fraud, or sexual violence, African Americans will be
targeted as the likely cause of the problem. 511 This is not to suggest that
African Americans will be the only people targeted and treated as a source of
surplus criminality. Other groups may be socially constructed in ways that
make them readily available for blame and censure as well. 512 In the current
panic, which has been articulated by primary and secondary definers as a "war
on terrorism," it is clear that Arabs, Middle-Eastern people, and Muslims have
all been constructed as the source of a likely threat. 5 13 It is instructive to observe
how readily this identification occurred. Within minutes of the attack on the
5 14
World Trade Center, the likely suspects were identified as "Arab terrorists."
The same thing occurred in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City
bombing. 5 15 The first bulletins that issued sought Middle-Easterners for the
crime 5 16 and at least one Arab-American was actually detained. 5 17 This
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40
How. L.J. 641, 672 (1997) (discussing how middle-class or well-to-do African Americans may be
perceived as drug dealers when seen driving expensive cars).
511. See supra note 501 and accompanying text (suggesting that African people will be
identified as the source of virtually any threatening behavior).
512. See Devon Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1288 (2002)
(asserting that "in America there is more than one race on the bottom").
513. See Leti Volpe, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1586-87 (2002)
(explaining that the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 gave currency to old
racist tropes concerning the barbaric and despotic Middle East).
514. Almost immediately after the World Trade Center was attacked, intelligence officials
blamed Osama bin Laden's militant Islamic organization, al Qaeda, for the terrorist act. See James
Risen & David Johnston, A Day of Terror: Intelligence Agencies; Officials Say They Saw No Signs
of Increased Terrorist Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A21 (quoting unnamed
counterterrorism officials for reports that eavesdropping intercepts indicated that bin Laden was
responsible for World Trade Center attacks). More importantly, the American public almost
instantly perceived the wrong-doers in the World Trade Center attacks as Arab terrorists, and did so
before any evidence about the identity of the suspected perpetrators was released. See Laurie
Goodstein, A Day of Terror: The Ties; In US., Echoes of Rift of Muslims and Jews, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2001, at A12 (describing accusations leveled against Muslims and Arab-Americans,
"[e]ven though there was no definitive information yet about who was behind the terrorist attacks");
Amy Harmon, A Day of Terror: The Talk Online; Web Offers Both News and Comfort, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2001, at A25 ("On many of the Internet discussion groups, participants blamed Arab
terrorists for the acts, and anti-Arab sentiment and slurs abounded.").
515. See Gustav Niebuhr, After the Attacks: The Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A8
(stating that after the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 "some media
reports, particularly on television, allowed free reign to the suspicion that Middle Eastern radicals
might be responsible") and Gustav Niebuhr, Religion Journal; In Shift, Islam is Unaffected by 2
Deadly Incidents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, §1, at 25 (stating that "in the immediate aftermath of
the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995 ...television reports hummed with speculation that the
attack was the work of Middle Eastern terrorists" and that these reports led to the harassment of
Arab-Americans and American Muslim organizations).
516. See Joseph P. Fried, Terror in Oklahoma: New York Trial; Defense Denied Mistrial
Request Over Oklahoma Blast Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 1995, at A26 (stating that "[i]nitial
news reports have suggested that investigators in the Oklahoma City explosion were looking for
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response could only occur so swiftly if Middle-Easterners were already socially
constructed as a potential threat. At the time of crisis, then, the natural and
reflexive response would be to blame Middle-Easterners, that is, to draw them
from the pool of surplus criminality.
It is important to remember that the theory of surplus criminality predicts
that those who are placed within the pool stand ready to be swiftly converted to
what ever the present need of the society is in regards to threats. Thus, the
theory of surplus criminality would predict that when Arabs, Middle-Eastern
people, and Muslims cannot be found, African Americans will be marshaled to
fill the role as threat. 5 18 My expectation is that somehow, America will find a
way to search, detain and identify African Americans as terrorists. 5 19 If there is

Arab suspects").
517. An American citizen of Jordanian background was detained in London after he fit a
profile being used to stop "young men traveling alone to destinations like the Middle East." David
Johnston, Terror in Oklahoma: The Investigation; A Piece of Rented Truck Offers a Clue to 2
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 1995, at A24. A white man, Timothy McVeigh, was ultimately
tried and convicted of bombing the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City. Raymond Bonner & Marc
Lacey, US. Plans Delay in First Execution in FourDecades, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at Al.
518. The War on Terrorism's current focus on Arabs and Middle-Easterners seems to have
reduced the degree to which other people of color are perceived as threats and required to prove their
allegiance to American institutions and goals. See Volpe, supra note 513, at 1584. But as Professor
Volpe cogently acknowledges, the current acceptance of people of color as "true Americans" is at
best a "momentary phenomenon." Id.at 1584, n.30. Cultural forces can be expected to push nonArab people of color, particularly African people, back into their usual status as objects of suspicion
and fear. There is some evidence that the re-identification of African Americans with the threat of
terrorism is already occurring. Some government agencies, fearing potential recruits to terrorist
causes, view the large number of African-American Muslims with alarm. See Patrick J. McDonnell,
FBI Focuses on Black Muslims in Seattle; Terrorism: Agents are Checking Possible Links Between
Local Mosques and Al Qaeda Network, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at Al (reporting that "court
papers suggest that FBI anxiety about radical African American Muslims has reemerged in the last
decade as the bureau has concentrated on Islamic terrorism."); Edward Hegstrom, A Twisting Trek:
FromBeautician to Terror Suspect, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 2002, at A29 (reporting concern
that "the mixing of a long-simmering resentment among some blacks and obvious hatred by some
Middle Easterners could create a dangerously explosive anti-American cocktail.").
519. Ihsan Bagby, a professor at Shaw University in North Carolina, has noted increased
surveillance of African American Muslims since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and argues
that "this is a combination of a focus on terrorism and an agenda about black 'radicals' and
Muslims-all lumped together." McDonnell, supra note 518, at Al. See also Karen Auge, In 1991,
Suspect Lionized as a Hero, DENVER POST, July 24, 2002, at AOl (discussing case of James Ujamaa,
an African American held as a terrorism suspect). One activist familiar with the James Ujamaa case
claimed Ujamaa was singled out because he was African American and a Muslim. "If he was a
white youth doing the same thing," Seattle activist Charlie James stated, "Idon't think [anyone]
would say [he's a] terrorist." Auge, supra, at AO1. As this article goes to press, a number of African
Americans have been arrested by the government as terrorism suspects allegedly connected to
Islamic or Middle Eastern groups, including two suspects charged with the shooting of thirteen
people in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. See Patrick J. McDonnell & Peter Y. Hong,
Response to Terror; Terrorism Case Shows US. Moving Proactively; Oregon: Some Groups
Question Tactic, Wonder Whether Muslims are Being Targetedfor Beliefs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2002, at p. 1 (reporting that several terrorism suspects connected with Portland, Oregon mosque are
African American converts to Islam); Steven A. Holmes, The Huntfor the Sniper: An Assumption
Undone; Many Voice Surprise Arrested Men are Black, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at A26
(reporting that two suspects arrested in Washington sniper case, John Allen Muhammad and John
Malvo, are African Americans).
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a social need to demonstrate that the government is responding to this newly
identified threat, the government will do so in ways that, like the drug war,
intrude less on the general population and intrude more on the African American
community.
CONCLUSION

Because of their historic connection to drugs in the American public
consciousness, African Americans provide a ready and available target for the
nation's war on drugs. Socially constructed as an "other" which is both
lascivious and violent, African Americans provide the perfect source when
white policy makers seek out both drug users and drug dealers for punishment
and ostracization. The close connection of race and crime in American culture
helped lead to the identification of drugs as the preeminent threat facing the
nation as Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency. Once drugs were identified
as a threat, African Americans were sure to be identified as the source of that
threat.
But the culpability of African people in the Euro-American mind is not
limited to drugs. Since race actually defines crime and crime produces racism,
African Americans will constitute "the usual suspects" no matter what the social
concern. The drug war is just a specific instance of this general problem. To
address the general problem, and thereby drain the pool of surplus criminality,
American culture has to be reshaped. The deep and sometimes hidden attraction
to racism in American culture must be confronted head on. In particular, the
way racism is both invoked and sheltered within the criminal justice system
must be addressed and eliminated. The criminal justice system, I have argued,
provides the foundation for racist attitudes and behaviors throughout society.
When the criminal justice foundation of racial prejudice is shattered, the entire
racist edifice will fall.
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